

ALTERNATE ROUTES

A Journal of Critical Social Research
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CULTURAL STUDIES

GRAMSCI, WOMEN AND THE STATE
Veronica Vazquez Garcia

PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN CANADA:
SUBORDINATE SERVICE
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HISTORICAL MATERIALISM BY CROSS-SECTIONAL
SURVEY DESIGN: THE LIMITS OF E.O. WRIGHT'S
STUDY OF CLASS STRUCTURE
David Hubka

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PRESENTATION AND EDITORIAL POLICY

ALTERNATE ROUTES is a refereed multi-disciplinary journal published annually by graduate students in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University in Ottawa. We hope to make AR a forum for debate and exchange among graduate students throughout the country and are therefore interested in receiving papers written by graduate students (or co-authored with faculty), regardless of their university affiliation.

The editorial emphasis is on the publication of critical and provocative analysis of theoretical and substantive issues which clearly have relevance for progressive political intervention. Although we welcome papers on a broad range of topics, members of the editorial board work within a feminist and/or marxist tradition. Therefore, we encourage submissions which advance or challenge questions and issues raised by these two broadly defined perspectives. We also welcome responses to and reviews of recent publications.

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A Journal of Critical Social Research

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CONTRIBUTORS AND INTRODUCTION

The cultural studies approach was imported to Canada through the Birmingham school and more recently has been enriched by scholarship coming from France and the United States. Today the approach is even broader than the sum of these international traditions because Canadians have brought to cultural studies a unique historical perspective. This new generation of Canadian trained social scientists cut their teeth in English Canadian political economy. What results are syntheses of these two very different approaches. Class, along with gender and ethnicity remain important shapers of the lives of people and bring a richer and deeper understanding of Canadian social reality.

The articles in this issue are representative of the breadth of interests that contribute to our knowledge of Canadian social practices and institutions. The uniqueness of the Canadian historical experience is evident in the papers included in this volume.

Veronica Vazquez Garcia is a graduate student at the department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, Ottawa. Her research focuses on the impact of cattle and oil industries on Nahua communities in Veracruz, southeastern Mexico. Her article in this issue explores the potential contribution that the Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, and in particular his concepts of ideology, hegemony, civil society and the state can make to the Neo-Marxist current within feminist theory. The exploration of these concepts is located in the context of the absence of concepts of the sexual division of labour and of women's oppression in Gramsci's work. The paper concludes that Gramsci's innovative theoretical and political contributions can be reformulated to deal with the contemporary concerns of socialist feminism.

David Skinner is a graduate student at the department of Communications at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia. Focusing on the historical relations between the state and private capital, his paper argues that broadcasting regulations in Canada

have generally subordinated the interests of public broadcasting to those of private capital since the advent of these regulations.

Paul Shreenan is a graduate student at the department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University. His research is on the development of the Maritime Fishermen's Union with specific focus on the impact of Acadian culture on the union in different sub-regions of the Maritimes. His article in this issue addresses the invisibility and undervaluation of women's labour among small boat fishers in Atlantic Canada. His basic contribution is the discussion of the role played by what the author terms "the ideological practice of independence" in reproducing the subordination of women in fisher households. This local ideological practice articulates with liberal, capitalist and patriarchal practices to legitimate the oppression of women.

David Hubka is a graduate student at the department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University. His area of interest is the construction of Canadian national identity through the media. In his paper in this issue, E.O. Wright's project is reviewed with respect to history and class structure. It is argued that Wright's treatment of historicity has been neglected within the debates generated by his project, and that, taken out of historical context, his conceptualization of class loses its explanatory power regarding Marxist theoretical integration and emancipatory strategies. Alternate formulations of Marxist theory and method for understanding class and history are offered, as well as directions for future research.

We hope that our readers will respond to this issue by sharing their ideas and critiques with the editorial collective.

GRAMSCI, WOMEN AND THE STATE

VERONICA VAZQUEZ GARCIA
Carleton University

INTRODUCTION

The "unhappy marriage" between Marxism and Feminism has given rise to an extensive debate. However, the feminist scholarship dealing with ideology and consciousness has not worked within a Marxist framework but rather has turned to psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theories to conceptualize consciousness, particularly the relationship of the body, sexuality and consciousness (Sandra Morgen, 1990). The purpose of this paper is to locate the feminist discussion of ideology within a Neo-Marxist framework by arguing the usefulness of some aspects of Gramscian theory to feminist theory and to consider its implications for feminist politics. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section I discuss some key concepts of Gramscian thought. The second section involves an assessment of Gramsci's work and suggests that he failed to account for both the sexual division of labour and women's oppression. The third and fourth sections focus on the use of key concepts of Gramscian thought from a feminist theoretical perspective aiming to address this failure. Finally, I outline some suggestions for feminist cultural critique and feminist politics drawing on Gramsci's idea of counter-hegemony.

I will organize my discussion of Gramsci around his concept of hegemony as it relates to his conception of civil society. I will then seek to explore the implications of these two concepts for his political strategy in relation to the State. I will argue that Gramsci's project for the construction of socialism and the revolution in the West neglects gender issues and as such can be located within the mainstream of Marxist thought which leaves the sexual division of labour untouched. However, Gramsci's concern with ideology allows for the theorization of the reproduction of patriarchy through cultural and ideological processes. More importantly, he helps us to understand the structures underpinning

patriarchal ideology. Similarly, feminist political agenda can be read as counter-hegemonic practices facing the type of State that Gramsci had in mind. The focus of this paper is the reconceptualization of Gramscian tools of analysis from a feminist perspective.

GRAMSCI: HEGEMONY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE.

The nature of Gramsci's texts has given rise to numerous problems. The Prison Notebooks were produced under difficult physical and intellectual conditions, and Gramsci considered them "unfinished fragments, elements and indications for further study" (Anne Showstack Sassoon, 1980:12). He used the same terms in different ways and created a code to deal with censorship. The development of his thought has been difficult to trace in terms of its continuity and change. Consequently, there is a large variety of readings of Gramsci. Showstack Sassoon refers to two types of readings. The first one, the "textual reading", "can attempt to trace the history of a concept internal to Gramsci's theoretical work, examining gaps, contradictions, coherence, advances", while neglecting the historical context from which Gramsci's work emerged (Ibid:15). The second possible type of reading emphasises this context, namely, "the debates and the experiences of the Second International and of the working-class movement in post-First World War Europe" (Ibid:16). Showstack Sassoon believes that reference to this context is necessary to understand Gramsci's major theoretical concerns. Hence, Gramsci's work can be read as dealing with the construction of socialism in the USSR as well as in terms of the "revolution in the West", which had to take into account special conditions of advanced capitalist societies.

Gramsci's major contribution to Marxist theory is his departure from the economic version of Marxism which sees the relationship between the material relations of production and the superstructure (ideological, legal, and political practices) as a mechanical one, where the latter are determined by the former. For Gramsci, "'popular beliefs' and similar ideas are themselves material forces" (Gramsci, 1971: 165). Ideas "are not spontaneously 'born' in each individual brain", but rather have "a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion..."

(Ibid:192). Ideology "is the more general term for the ways in which certain sets of ideas and assumptions become dominant forces in society" (Tony Bennett et al, 1981:207). These ideas are contained in

1.-language itself, which is a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just of words grammatically devoid of content; 2.-"common sense" and "good sense";3.-popular religion and, therefore, also in the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and of acting, which are collectively bundled together under the name of 'folklore' (Gramsci,1971:323).

The implication of Gramsci's conception of ideology is fivefold:

Focus is shifted from the intellectual plane of philosophical systems to the formation of popular consciousness or common sense. Second there is less emphasis on ideology as "system", as integrated or coherent. Third ideological struggle is viewed, not as titanic struggles between rival Weltanschauung, but as practical engagements about shifts and modifications in "common sense" or popular consciousness. Fourth is the emphasis on ideologies as active processes which "'organize' human masses and create the terrain on which men (sic) move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc." (1971:377). Fifth his conception of ideology is positive whilst Marx's was negative. For Marx ideology blocked and distorted, whilst for Gramsci it provided the very mechanisms through which any participation in social life was possible (Alan Hunt, 1990:5).

Gramsci's conception of ideology as a non-unitary bloc where the interests of subordinate classes are constantly negotiated, allows us to trace the constitution of a social class as

politically dominant in particular historical circumstances. Gramsci calls hegemony the mobilizing capacity of a social class to both dominate subaltern classes and lead allied ones. He suggests that a class must exercise "leadership before winning governmental power", and when it becomes dominant "it must continue to 'lead' as well" (1971:58). A particular historical bloc emerges from the various processes of conflicts, negotiations and compromises among different classes and social groups. The hegemony that this historical bloc exercises "must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group [class] in the decisive nucleus of economic activity", but this nucleus is far from being the only determinant, since hegemony must also be "ethical-political" (Ibid:161). Hence, the political hegemony of a social class depends on its ability to generate "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great mass of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group [class]" (Ibid:12).

A new way of looking at the relationship between civil society and the State stems from Gramsci's conception of hegemony. For Gramsci, civil society is no longer the private realm of mere economic relations, as in Marx, but rather it is "the ensemble of organisms called 'private'", where hegemony of the dominant class is exercised (Idem). In other words, civil society is the social space where consent is generated and resistance to dominant hegemony may be built upon. As Ralph Dahrendorf puts it, civil society is "the intermediate world" between the State and the individual (1990:18). Civil society is constituted by institutions whose degree of autonomy from the State vary from case to case.

Gramsci defines the State in modern societies as "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (1971:244). By insisting that "by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society" (Ibid:261), Gramsci avoids an overemphasis on either the coercive or consensual elements of the State. He conceives the State as having a possible historical existence between the two poles of coercion and consent, and the

relationship between civil society and the State takes a special form in every historical conjuncture. Therefore, the distinction between civil society as the realm for consent and political society or the State as the realm for coercion is for Gramsci a "methodological" rather than an "organic one".

The relationship between civil society and the State is the major difference between the "East" and the "West":

In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only on outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks (Ibid:238).

Gramsci's new strategy for socialist revolution in the West stems from this distinction between the "East" and the "West". The fact that in the West there is a "sturdy structure of civil society", or a complex network of institutions, makes crucial the battle for hegemony. Gramsci refers to this battle as the war of position. The success of the working class in this battle is the pre-condition for securing its political power. As Anne Showstack Sassoon suggests, "the key phrase is Gramsci's specification that once the war of position is won, it is won definitively. Or, in other terms, only when the working class has won the battle of hegemony will it have triumphed definitively" (1980:196). This battle must continue during the building of socialism; it is never won once and for all.

The war of position is a battle for hegemony in which intellectuals play an essential role. Although Gramsci believes that "all men [sic] are intellectuals" (1971:9) in the sense that all individuals make sense of their world, he makes clear that only some of them "have in society the function of intellectuals" (Idem). This function is mainly on "organisational" and "connective" one. The intellectual's relationship with "the world of production" is "'mediated' by the whole fabric of society of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the 'functionaries'"

(Ibid:12). Hence, intellectuals articulate social hegemony not only in the field of production, but also in that of culture and political administration (Ibid:97).

The degree of connection between intellectuals and "a fundamental social group" varies for each case, and Gramsci suggests that a whole range of "organicity" of intellectual strata can be established depending on this connection. Gramsci calls organic intellectuals those created together with a social class and responsible for giving this class

homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc (Ibid:5).

Traditional intellectuals, by contrast, are those "already in existence" when a new social class emerges. Since they belong to a previous historical time, and have links with previous dominant classes, they remain unconnected with the emerging mode of production. Traditional intellectuals "represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms" (Gramsci quoted by Showstack Sassoon, 1980).

Since the nature of the relationship both between intellectuals themselves and between intellectuals and the various social classes affects the very nature of hegemony, it is essential that the working class creates its own organic intellectuals. It is within the party that these intellectuals are to be formed, since the party is the central organizer of the working class hegemony. Gramsci compares the political party to the state in its role of articulating an hegemonic project:

The political party...is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other words it is

responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given group -the dominant one- and the traditional intellectuals. The party carries out this function in strict dependence on its basic function, which is that of elaborating its own component parts - those elements of a social group which has been born and developed as an "economic" group- and of turning them into qualified intellectuals, leaders and organisers of all activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political (Gramsci, 1971:15-16).

In order to turn the working class as an "economic group" into "qualified intellectuals, leaders and organizers", the party must exercise some leadership. This leadership must not be an "abstract" one but rather must apply

itself to real men [sic], formed in specific historical relations, with specific feelings, outlooks, fragmentary conceptions of the world, etc., which [are] the result of 'spontaneous' combinations of a given situation of material production with the 'fortuitous' agglomeration within it of disparate social elements (Ibid:198).

The role of the party is to "educate", "direct", "purge of extraneous contaminations" this element of "spontaneity", in order to "bring it into line with modern theory -but in a living and historically effective manner" (Idem). Hence, the "unity between 'spontaneity' and 'conscious leadership' or 'discipline' is precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes, insofar as this is mass politics and not merely an adventure by groups claiming to represent the masses" (Idem).

GRAMSCI: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE

Gramsci's originality is mainly due to his emphasis on the reproduction of forms of ideological domination through social practices at a daily level. From this conception of ideology, a paramount need is to look at civil society as a major site where dominant hegemony can be contested. However, the fact that Gramsci

wrote the Prison Notebooks thinking of a working class project somehow narrows the applicability of his categories to other kinds of analysis. Gramsci's starting point is the assumption that the working class is being oppressed by the place it occupies in the relations of production, and therefore the working class is its own agent of liberation in the sense that it is capable of "leading" other classes towards revolutionary change. In the organization of working class hegemony, other social groups and classes can only work as either allies or enemies, and Gramsci gives no indication about how to articulate the struggle against class oppression with other kinds of oppression other than under the working class and the party's leadership.

Hence, the whole set of categories of Gramsci emerges from the centrality that the working class has in his project for socialist revolution. For example, although dominant hegemony is articulated at different levels of the superstructure by organic intellectuals, "it must be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group [class] in the decisive nucleus of economic activity" (Ibid:161) and therefore is closely linked to material relations of production, or "the factory" (Ibid:285). This does not have to be a problem per se, except for the fact that Gramsci also assumes that all the members of the working class are male, and in doing so he obscures women's oppression not only as members of the working class but also as women.

This problem becomes relevant in Gramsci's discussion of Fordism, which deals with Gramsci's exposure of monogamy among the working class as functional for capitalist profit. Gramsci draws the link between a discipline of the instincts in the assembly-line and a regimentation of sexual life and in so doing he shows how capitalism has generated a civiltà or a way of living beneficial to capitalist production. However, only the classes tied to production are subjected to puritanical morality, since the "'puritanical' initiatives simply have the purpose of preserving, outside of work, a certain psycho-physical equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the worker, exhausted by the new method of production" (Gramsci quoted by Buci-Glucksmann, 1980:84). Concerning the morality of classes other than the working class, Gramsci argues that

The most noteworthy fact in the American phenomenon in relation to these manifestations is the gap which has been formed and is likely to be increasingly accentuated, between the morality and way of life of the workers and those of other strata of the population (1971:304).

Thus, Gramsci's claim that "the new industrialism wants monogamy" (Idem) refers only to the working class' family where monogamy as a repression of sexual needs can be explained by the link of the worker to the relations of production. However, this repression applies only to male workers who cannot afford "a night of 'excess'" after work because it affects their performance at work the following day. Gramsci does not speak about the repression of women's sexuality, and so we have to assume that there is not such thing, or that it is similar to that of their husbands (which, needless to say, is quite unlikely) if women are also working in the assembly line. Moreover, Gramsci leaves unproblematic the availability of women to meet men's sexual needs, when equating the (male) worker's impossibility "to dedicate himself to the pursuit of drink or to sport or evading the law" (Idem) to his lack of time for "womanizing", since all these activities demand too much leisure. Gramsci does not talk about the male worker's wife nor does he problematize the existence of prostitutes with whom working class men can have a "night of excess" whereas their wives cannot. The only type of prostitutes Gramsci speaks of are the wives of American millionaires who go to Europe to "contract 'marriages' for a season" as a way of escaping boredom and a mere form of entertainment (Ibid:306).

Gramsci's discussion of puritanical morality precludes the possibility of analysis of the family as a realm where a different type of relations of subordination of women by men takes place. Gramsci does not examine the sexual division of labour and the power relations between men and women resulting from this division, and therefore the little insight that he sheds in the nature of women's oppression is an appendix of the relations of production, where women's situation is defined by their husbands' link to these relations. Women whose husbands are closely tied to these relations do not represent a problem (repression of sexuality in Gramsci refers only to male sexuality), while women whose husbands are

millionaires are "luxury mammals" and can afford behaving like prostitutes as a way of entertainment. What is even more striking is that Gramsci speaks of these millionaires as hardworking men whose wealth make their wives passive, and so the "loose" morality of upper classes is applicable only to women. Gramsci presents the "prostitution" of women of the upper classes as resulting from their own will ("the women, with nothing to do, travel" [Idem]) rather than from men's financial power, while the prostitution of women in the lower classes is not even dealt with.

Gramsci's assumption that all members of the working class are male translates into his agenda for cultural critique and therefore the scope of this critique is a limited one. The critique of culture involves for Gramsci "a critique of capitalist civilization" in order to form "the unified consciousness of the proletariat" (Gramsci quoted by Buci-Glucksmann, 1980:39); he refers to his own work in the cultural field as a battle for a culture that would be "an instrument and form needed for the political emancipation of a class" (Ibid:79). Accordingly, the intellectuals who organize a counter-hegemonic project "have to be oriented towards the revolutionary proletariat" (Ibid:28) and must work with the political party. When Gramsci talks about the role of the party as articulator of a new civilta he clearly refers to the working class as the generator of these new ways of life and calls them "proletarian culture". Hence, although it is true that there is great novelty in Gramsci's political strategy for social change, the new hegemony he refers to is a working class hegemony which leaves untouched other forms of oppression.

The key issue now is to examine the extent to which Gramsci's failure to account for women's oppression and his project of emancipation for the working class obscures gender inequality and precludes women's own emancipatory practices. In other words, the usefulness of Gramscian analysis for feminist politics has to be established. I think that the possibility exists for a dialogue between Gramsci and feminist theory in order to expose women's oppression and explore how it interweaves with class oppression. However, this is not a matter of just "adding on" women to the Gramscian project in terms of political struggle, but rather of giving centrality to the relationships of oppression of women by

men in theoretical analysis. This kind of work has to be done if we want to create critical awareness and problematize works produced by progressive intellectuals, such as Paul Willis' Learning to Labour, (1977) where patriarchal attitudes and assumptions of working class "lads" are uncritically viewed as forms of resistance to dominant hegemony (Angela McRobbie, 1981).

WOMEN AND CIVIL SOCIETY

As pointed out in the previous section, Gramsci's assumption that all members of the working class are male leads to a failure to theorize women's oppression in the work place and in other spheres of their lives. In this section, I will discuss the socialist feminist approach to women's subordination in capitalist society in order to broaden the Gramscian project of counter-hegemony by incorporating into the analysis two points traditionally overlooked by Marxist class analysis: a) the notion of a gendered working class (and labour force) and b) the sphere of reproduction. I will mainly refer to Alison M. Jaggar's (1983) account of socialist feminist theory.

Socialist feminists believe that "a full understanding of the capitalist system requires a recognition of the way in which it is structured by male dominance and, conversely, that a full understanding of contemporary male dominance requires a recognition of the way it is organized by the capitalist division of labour" (Alison M. Jaggar, 1983:125). Hence, the socialist feminist approach utilizes the method of historical materialism to explore "the social relations that constitute humans not only as workers and capitalists but also as women and men" (Ibid:132). In order to achieve this, socialist feminist theory attempts to reconceptualize both the private sphere of human reproduction and the public sphere of human production. Socialist feminists argue that human reproduction is a form of labour and that the prevailing system of organizing reproduction is alienating and exploitative for women. This theory provides a way of understanding the segregation by sex of the labour force as well as sexuality, childbearing and personal maintenance in political and economic terms.

Socialist feminists' major divergency with traditional Marxism is their conception of what sets of relationships constitute the economic base of a mode of production.

They claim that the economic foundation of society includes a characteristic system of organizing procreation [reproduction] which, in historical times, has been defined in part by a characteristic sexual division of labour. This system of procreation is among the most pervasive influences on the culture of a society, understood in the sense of its "legal, political, religious, aesthetic and philosophic...forms" and is important in setting limits to what forms can ultimately exist in that society. Much feminist theory consist precisely in tracing connections between the sexual division of labour and procreation, the sexual division of labour in the market and the ideological sexism embodied in law, politics, religion, aesthetics and philosophy (Ibid:142).

Thus, socialist feminists believe it is misleading to think of the public and private as two distinct spheres:

"production" and "reproduction", work and the family, far from being separate territories like the moon and the sun of the kitchen and the shop, are really intimately related modes that reverberate upon one another and frequently occur in the same social, physical, and even psychic spaces...Not only reproduction and kinship, or the family, have their own, historically determined, products, material techniques, modes or organization and power relationships, but reproduction and kinship are themselves integrally related to the social relations of production and the state, they reshape these relations all the time (Rosalind Petchesky quoted by Alison M. Jaggar, Ibid:146).

Similarly, Joan Kelly believes that

We can no longer focus upon productive relations of class, suppressing those of consumption (sexuality/family) as Marx did, or focus on sex and family arrangements (Freud, and Juliet Mitchell in Psychoanalysis and Feminism) without those of class, any more than we can place one sex in the category of sexuality/family and the other in that of society. To do so violates our social experience and the new consciousness that is emerging out of it. A more complex pattern of sociosexual arrangements is called for - and is appearing in feminist social thought. Feminist thought regards the sexual/familial organization of society as integral to any conception of social structure or social change. And conversely, it sees the relation of the sexes as formed by both socioeconomic and sexual-familial structures in their systematic interconnectedness (Ibid:147).

By including childbearing and sexual activities into the socio-economic foundation of society, socialist feminist theory broadens the set of institutions that shape civil society. From a socialist feminist perspective, civil society is not, as in Marx, the realm of mere relations of production. Nor is it "the ensemble of organisms called 'private'", as in Gramsci, since he did not see the specificity of relations of subordination of women by men in some institutions of civil society. As pointed out by Mary O'Brien:

Gramsci's notion of civil society is ... circumscribed by his fixation on education and his neglect of family relations. He speaks of civil society as local culture centred on school and family but ... has little to say about family. He is more interested in the birth of organic intellectuals than in the birth of real babies (1984:92).

By contrast, socialist feminist theory demonstrates that sexuality and reproduction are organized through institutions such as

marriage and the family, which have a historical development, are subject to state regulation and are closely interconnected with the relations of production. Sexuality and reproduction are a part of the socio-economic foundation of society or the public sphere, and civil society is constituted by institutions that channel women into motherhood and childbearing and the sex-segregated job market.

Accordingly, the conception of dominant hegemony implies not only class domination but also male supremacy. An analysis of dominant hegemony must explore the relationship between, on the one hand, women's lack of access to resources and economic as well as political power and, on the other hand, the social constructions of motherhood and "women's work". The conception of dominant hegemony can illuminate the processes through which male supremacy is accepted as common sense and as part of the natural order in order to explore women's consent to patriarchal practices or, in Jagger's words, women's "internalization" of their oppressive "external" reality. Finally, Gramsci's notion of counter-hegemony allows us to see patriarchal ideology as a non-unitary bloc where women may constantly open up spaces for negotiation.

WOMEN AND THE STATE

A feminist approach to the state must explore the processes through which the whole set of interconnections between the division of labour in the domestic sphere, the labour market and state policy reproduce male supremacy and capitalist relations of production while also creating new contradictions in people's lives and hence new spaces for negotiation. This analysis is essential because the fact that today most women combine formal paid work with full adult domestic responsibilities or (as in the Third World) perform several activities as a source for extra income (i.e. the informal sector) coupled with domestic work at home has generated a whole new set of policies which directly affect women. State policies have the power to construct categories of women as workers and mothers. State legislation sets the limits within which women control their own sexuality in terms of birth control, abortion law, maternity leaves and child care services. It also establishes the legal means and implications of forming or dissolving a family unit. In other words, the state has a lot of

say in the organization of reproduction, in the sense that it reinforces existing familial forms where women are responsible for taking care of the family needs. This fact creates constant contradictions in women's lives and opens up new spaces for negotiation.

The expansion of the welfare state aiming to respond to emerging women's needs is a process that can be traced from a Gramscian perspective. Concomitantly, possibilities for social change can be explored in the articulation of these new needs which the state decides to either act or not act upon. Gramsci helps to see pieces of legislation on women's needs as resulting from pressures that the women's movement puts on a capitalist state and at the same time as an attempt of this state to intervene into a new area of civil society in order to avoid possible social explosion and reorganize a social base of consent. Thus, Gramsci is useful to see the changes of state practices as a positive "sign of ideological change in the wider society and a measure of the strength of women's mobilizations", while keeping in mind that "the ideological consensus into which feminist demands are integrated is not only one that balances gender oppression, but is fundamentally conservative, part of managing a society by a capitalist state" (Heather Jon Maroney, 29).

Gramsci then offers the theoretical guidelines for a "third way" in feminist politics. His notion of historical bloc highlights the relationship between women and the state, an overlooked area of study in feminist literature (Jane Jenson, 1986; Drude Dahlerup, 1987). From a Gramscian perspective, women's needs can be seen as partially represented in the dominant hegemony in a particular historical conjuncture. This representation can be viewed as resulting from processes of negotiation between different social groups and interests, among them women's organizations. The notion of historic bloc allows us to escape from an instrumental view of the state (i.e. men control the state and use it to keep women in a subordinate position) or a functionalist one (i.e. the state is a patriarchal state and in all ways contributes to women's oppression). Since the historic bloc is not reducible to a ruling class or group (i.e. men), it allows to see the state as a structure where various groups and interests are unevenly organized

rather than as an entity with its own will (i.e. "the state is at present looking for new forms of patriarchal control", Zillah Eisenstein quoted by Dahlerup, 1987). Consequently, the state becomes an arena of negotiation where some battles can be "won" by subordinate groups, in this case women. However, Gramsci's emphasis on both sides of domination (coercion and consent) keeps us away from the danger of overestimating these triumphs. Indeed, Gramsci's war of position allows us to overcome the difficulty of considering the same state action as either oppressive of women or liberating, if we place it within a context of constant negotiation. More importantly, Gramsci reminds us of the importance of civil society as a major arena where consensus occurs and a counter-hegemonic project must be built upon.

In her analysis of women's dual role and the British welfare state, Anne Showstack Sassoon argues that there is a contradiction between the domestic sphere, the world of work and the welfare state, in that

the institutions and practices of the welfare state are organized around the same traditional model of work and domestic life, where women remain the backbone of domestic labour, and the world of work is organized round a "male model" which assumes one human being at work for, say, forty hours a week (plus commuting and possible overtime) with a partner available fulltime for domestic tasks (1987:160).

Showstack Sassoon describes these conflicts as "part of a long-term development, what Gramsci would have called an organic crisis" (Idem). Accordingly, she points out that "a battle on all fronts, a war of position in Gramsci's terms, a strategy of reforms" (Ibid:174) is the solution to the problem. Hence, she suggests that the struggle should involve not only the negotiation over "caring and servicing responsibilities" between civil society and the state, but also the emergence of "post-male models of work", that is, a structural change in the organization of people's time. This change would imply the abolition of particular conceptions of male work and female work, both in the labour market and the family, as well as a total restructuration of the sexual division of labour at

all levels of society. In order to do so, Showstack Sassoon states that a "cultural revolution" both in the part of women and men is needed. In other words, state legislation favouring child care and parental leaves are a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve equality between women and men. Civil society as a whole should be involved in the implementation of changes in the organization of all spheres of work. The logic of work in the productive sphere as well as that of state provided services should be transformed in order to meet the social needs of concrete individuals.

The socialist feminism's goal of human emancipation involves not only the full development of human potentialities through free productive labour, but also "for free sexual expression, for freely bearing children and for freely rearing them" (Alison M. Jaggar, 1983:131). This ideal of human well-being also calls for change in all institutions in civil society:

To restructure how we come to know self and others in our birthing, growing up, loving and working, feminist politics must reach the institutions that fatefully bear upon sexuality, family, and community. Schools and all socializing agencies will have to be rid of sex and sexual bias. Work and welfare will have to be placed in the humane context of the basic right to all to live, work, and love in dignity. And there will have to be a genuine participation by all in shaping the modes and purposes of our labour and distributing its returns. A feminist politics that aims at abolishing all forms of hierarchy so as to restructure personal relations as well as relations among peers has to reach and transform the social organization of work, property and power (Joan Kelly quoted by Alison M. Jaggar, Ibid:147)

Socialist feminism's conception of social change underpin the necessity of new types of organizations to bring about this change. Showstack Sassoon suggests that organizations such as trade unions should be concerned not only with the protection of people's work but also with the organization of their domestic needs in relation

to their paid work and vice versa, and break with the assumption "that people should adjust their lives to the job and not the other way around" (1987:176). Analogously, Jaggar argues that the organizations advocated by socialist feminists are not only dedicated to overthrow the capitalist mode of production but also to struggle against the way through which men perpetuate their dominance: rape, sexual harassment, domestic assault, refusal to take equal share of household responsibilities and sexism within the organizations themselves (1983:331-332).

Socialist feminists advocate the need for a cultural revolution and believe that the creation of a women's culture is an important way in which women can develop political self-consciousness. Jaggar argues that a socialist feminist culture is part of a wide range of political activity which has not clearcut priorities; socialist feminists struggle on all fronts and constantly pursue to create alternative institutions. However, they are aware of the limits that the larger society imposes on the possibilities of alternative ways for living and working. There is a great similarity between Gramsci's idea that the working class has to ensure hegemony before winning political power and the socialist feminist approach to social change:

Socialist feminists expect that there will be a distinctive revolutionary period, characterized by acute social turmoil, but they also expect that the outcome of this turmoil will be determined by the kind and quality of the pre-revolutionary activity that preceded it. To this extent, they see themselves not so much as living the revolution as preparing for it and attempting in limited ways to prefigure it (Ibid:340).

Before the social turmoil reaches us, I shall give an example of the type of institutional change socialist feminists are aiming for. In her study on the effects that the work of feminist teachers has for social change, Kathleen Weiler combines three major themes of feminist methodology with some of the premises of what she calls critical educational theory, of which Gramsci is considered an essential contribution. The first theme is that "feminist researchers begin their investigation of the social world from a

grounded position in their own subjective oppression", what "leads them to a sensitivity to power that comes from being subordinate". Second, "feminist research is characterized by an emphasis on lived experience and the significance of everyday life". Finally, "feminist research is politically committed". These two last themes imply that feminist research has to shed light in women's personal experiences of subjugation within a male dominated society and that this research is committed to search for ways to change women's situation (1988: 58-59). From critical educational theory Weiler retains Gramsci's "analysis of the power of hegemonic ideas to shape consciousness coupled with his unshakable belief in the power of critique and political activism" (Ibid:17). Accordingly, Weiler argues that the Gramscian concept of counter-hegemony has to be applied to feminist work, because counter-hegemony "implies a more critical theoretical understanding and is expressed in organized and active political opposition" (Ibid:54). Weiler concludes that the in the school, which she considers an "institution for social control", the attitudes of feminist teachers can be viewed as counter-hegemonic in that they encourage students to explore the forces acting upon their own lives and to understand their own history and culture:

In their work, these feminist teachers raise issues of sexism and racism directly in texts, but also in classroom relationships with students. As feminists they make the gendered subjectivities of themselves and their students part of the texts they teach. And at the same time, they ground a critical inquiry in a deep respect for their student's lives and cultural values (Ibid:149).

The points of intersection between Gramsci and feminism can be clearly drawn upon in this last paragraph: both Gramsci and feminism stress the importance of daily lives and cultural values (or, in Gramsci's words, "popular beliefs"); both of them believe that these values reproduce power relations (or, in Gramsci's words, dominant hegemony) and therefore they require critical inquiry (or, in Gramsci's words, the struggle between "common sense" and "good sense" has to be carried out), which in turn opens up spaces for negotiation. And finally, the work of inquiry is undertaken both at the level of texts, and at the level of social

relationships between teachers and students and the students themselves. In Gramsci's words, ideology is not a set of ideas but rather a set of material practices and social relations.

Once the central role of a male working class in instigating social change has been problematized, the question still remains of which social group or class is more likely to bring about social change, or where is it going to come from. Evidently, the socialist feminist answer to this question is that women must play an essential role in bringing about social change. In fact, it can be argued that there has been an increasing role of women's participation in socialist revolutions, with Nicaragua as the best example of a crucial women's involvement in the revolutionary as well as in the post-revolutionary period (Maxine Molyneux, 1985, 1989). It is clear now that, after Nicaragua, there cannot be a socialist revolution without women, or in other words, a real revolution must be not only a socialist but rather a socialist feminist one. Interestingly, women's involvement has been determined not only by their concern to protect specific women's interests, but also to defend popular-democratic or national interests, like in Nicaragua, where a long anti-American tradition rooted in a popular movement existed long time before the Sandinistas took power in 1979. In that particular case, women were struggling not only against their subordinate status in society but also against a dictatorship backed up by American intervention. Correspondingly, women were benefited by post-revolutionary policies not only as women but also as members of a particular class, since these "policies were targeted in favour of the poorest sections of the population and focused on basic needs in the areas of health, housing, education and food subsidies" (Maxine Molyneux, 1985:248). Obviously, poor women benefited more than other women, although needless to say, women formed more than 60 percent of the poorest Nicaraguans (Idem).

Thus, the case of Nicaragua is useful to see how factors of class, gender, race, ethnicity and nationality intersect in a particular historical conjuncture, so that it becomes difficult to establish the role of a particular class or group to "lead" the revolution. My suggestion here is that, rather than establishing a priori the revolutionary agent, we have to emphasize the idea that

counter-hegemony involves the articulation of the interests of various classes and groups, and that this articulation depends on the visibility of these classes and groups in a particular historical moment. Again, the gestation of counter-hegemony has to be looked at as an ongoing process of negotiation. However, this is not to say that class or group interests are indistinguishable from one another or equally valid, or that the articulation is an easy one and goes without struggle between and within the groups. Rather, the case of Nicaragua demonstrates that women must constantly put pressure on the revolutionary government to defend women's interests and, more importantly, that women must have their own independent organizations. In this sense, a distinction between different levels within a counter-hegemonic project regarding women's interests can be established, similar to the different stages that Alan Hunt describes for the "incorporative hegemony" of the working class (1990:7-10). Molyneux's distinction between strategic gender interests and practical gender interests is an useful one for this purpose.

Molyneux grounds her distinction on the recognition that "there is no theoretically adequate and universally applicable causal explanation of women's oppression from which a general account of women's interests can be derived" (231). Hence, "a theory of interests that has an application to the debate about women's capacity to struggle for and benefit from social change must begin by recognizing difference rather than by assuming homogeneity" (232). Molyneux's distinction helps us to explain how the intersection among different factors other than gender that affect women -class, ethnicity, nationality and so on- produce different ways of defining women's interests.

According to Molyneux, strategic gender interests are those

derived in the first instance deductively, that is, from the analysis of women's subordination and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist ... such as the abolition of the sexual division of labour, the alleviation of the burden of domestic labour and childcare, the removal of institutionalized forms of

discrimination, the attainment of political equality, the establishment of freedom of choice over childbearing, and the adoption of adequate measures against male violence and control over women ... The demands that are formulated on this basis are usually termed "feminist" as is the level of consciousness required to struggle effectively for them (Ibid:232-233).

In contrast,

practical gender interests are given inductively and arise from the concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labour...[they] are formulated by the women who are themselves within these positions rather than through external interventions. Practical interests are usually a response to an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality (Ibid:233)

Hence, women's special interest in domestic provision and public welfare is a practical gender interest which does not necessarily promote gender equality, since it may eventually strengthen women's role as the primary responsible for the household daily welfare.

The two levels of gender interests can be articulated differently into what Alan Hunt refers to as "incorporative hegemony". According to him "for a hegemony to be dominant it must address and incorporate, if only partially, some aspects of the aspirations, interests and ideology of subordinate groups" (1990:6). Just as the working class has to give up some of its interests when articulating this "incorporative hegemony" in order to transcend the "economic-corporate" stage and reach that of "hegemonic consciousness", women may also have to give up temporarily the final goal of complete abolition of gender inequality (a strategic gender interest) whilst still struggling for gender practical interests. However, this is not to say that women should substitute the male working class or any other group in the leadership of a counter-hegemonic project; rather, the complexity of social reality and the intersection of different factors influencing social change call for a more pluralistic

conception of agency, where, as stated before, different social groups have more or less weight and say in a counter-hegemonic historical bloc depending on their visibility at a particular moment in history. In this sense, it is essential to stress again the necessity of women's own independent organizations whose final goal must be to overcome women's subordination; needless to say, the initiative to achieve this goal must come primarily from women.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have argued that Gramsci's assumption that all members of the working class are male leads to a failure to theorize women's oppression in the work place and other spheres of their lives. Consequently, Gramsci's working class hegemony is a male hegemony and his project for socialist revolution does not include per se women's emancipation. The socialist feminist approach to women's subordination brings the organization of reproduction into the agenda and inserts the significance of gender into the labour process. This allows us to explain not only the constitution of people as capitalists and workers but also as women and men. Thus, Gramsci's project of counter-hegemony should include changes in the sexual division of labour at all levels of society. In this sense, Gramsci is useful to grasp the processes of articulation of women needs within a historical bloc as well as women's responses to the existing contradictions in their own lives through the negotiation with the state over servicing and caring responsibilities, which are deeply shaped by the sexual division of labour. Finally, I discussed some similarities between Gramsci's suggestion to organize a new alternative hegemony at the level of civil society before gaining political power and the feminist claims that "the personal is political" and "a woman's place is everywhere". Gramsci's conception of the relationship between civil society and the state and his notion of war of position over civil society provide the theoretical guidelines for feminist politics in order to keep on thinking of the personal as political and seek to change people's ideas of a socially constructed femininity which is oppressive for women, search for alliances in the process of gestation of counter-hegemony and dismiss as irrelevant the dilemma to struggle either "within or outside the State".

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PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN CANADA: SUBORDINATE SERVICE

DAVID SKINNER

Simon Fraser University

INTRODUCTION

It is a popular conception that although broadcasting regulation was undertaken to give public broadcasting the central role in the broadcasting system, today the situation is reversed and the public service mainly compensates for the inadequacies of private broadcasters (Salter 232). Generally, proponents of this view frame the history of broadcasting as a struggle between competing interest groups, with those representing the cultural objectives of broadcasting locked in a losing battle with economically motivated private interests.

This paper places the history of public broadcasting, as represented in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), in a different perspective. Focusing on the historical relations constructed between the state and private capital through intervention, it demonstrates that the structure of regulation has subordinated public broadcasting to the economic interests of private broadcasters since the legislation of the 1932 Broadcasting Act. While the history of broadcasting is indeed the product of real historical struggles, the regulatory framework has contextualized these struggles so as to foreground the reproduction of private capital. In this way, the marginalization of public broadcasting can be seen as more the product of the regulatory framework than the political prowess of any particular interest group.

THE STATE, CAPITAL, AND REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

The history of broadcasting regulation is of course inextricably bound up within the history of the Canadian state. From the rationales that have both prompted and guided intervention, to the regulatory bodies that have shepherded the growth of the system, to the political-economic forces that have contextualized its growth - the state and its attendant instruments and policies have played a central role in shaping the broadcasting system. To develop a purchase on why public broadcasting is now marginal to private interests within the broadcasting system, the historical relations between the state and private capital must be examined.

Tracing such relations has long been the project of Canadian political economy. Here, the growth of private capital in Canada

has often been seen as fostered by government intervention. As Aitken (184) notes:

The standard interpretation of the entire history of the Canadian economy assigns to the state a major role in guiding and stimulating development; on any reading of the historical record government policies and decisions stand out as the key factor.

Moreover, Panitch (14) writes that the state has "provided the technical infrastructure for capitalist development when this was too risky or costly for private capital to undertake itself, "and that state ownership has not traditionally been undertaken "with the aim of managing or controlling the economy, but always with a view to facilitating further capital accumulation in the private sphere to the end of economic growth." However, there is little consensus as to why or how the state has acted in this manner.

Marchak (692) illustrates that the literature in this area has traditionally forwarded two basic perspectives on the Canadian state: i) an "instrumentalist version," which leads to the expectation that the state "heeds capitalist demands in specific instances"; ii) a structuralist version, which instead suggests that the state "has 'relative autonomy' from business and introduces legislation in response to numerous pressures." While the instrumental approach is useful for sketching social relations in particular historical moments, it portrays the state as subject to the whims of particular individuals or elites and offers little illustration of how the structure of the state constrains relationships between the state and private capital. The structuralist perspective, while moving to overcome this weakness, often falls prey to a functionalist vision of the relations between the state and private capital and fails to illustrate how these relationships are maintained through changing social conditions.

The work of Claus Offe offers a way out of this impasse. For Offe (13), the impetus to state intervention is embedded in the very structure of the capitalist system which leaves the state both dependent on the process of accumulation for its survival and yet prohibits it from "organizing" production according to its own political criteria (because) "property is private." Thus the state is trapped in contradiction: on one hand, forced to intervene in the economy to guarantee its own reproduction; on the other, to structure its interventions such that they do not interfere with the prerogatives of private capital. In accomplishing this the state "protects and sanctions a set of rules and social relationships" which give rise to accumulation. Over periods of time, these practices are sedimented into institutional relations between the state and private capital. Here the state is not the instrument of the ruling class, nor does it defend the interests of one class in some mechanistic way. Rather, by contextualizing social struggles in terms of reproduction of private capital, it

protects the "common interest of all members of a capitalist class society." Following Offe's line of analysis, both the regulatory commission and the crown corporation, instruments central to the broadcasting system, can be seen as sets of institutional relationships born of government support for the orderly growth and maintenance of capital accumulation: the former acting as an arbiter between competing interests; the latter providing infrastructure for capital development.

The first regulatory commission was instituted in 1903 for the resolution of problems between competing economic interests in the operation of the railways. As the railways opened up areas of the country for exploitation, tensions developed between railway companies and economic interests situated in the hinterland. The structure of the state proved inadequate for dealing with this competition, and pressure mounted for an "independent" agency that would possess both the expertise to make decisions regarding railways and be distant enough from government to be somewhat insulated from political currents of perquisites and patronage. The regulatory commission combined legislative, judicial, and executive functions in one structure and basically functioned to adjudicate disputes between private interests and offer some assurance of the regular operation of these vital links in the economic infrastructure.

The literature on regulatory commissions generally interprets their evolution in one of two ways: older works see state intervention as moving to "correct the failures of the marketplace, enhance the quality of life, and ensure economic efficiency and minimum rates by bringing a broader conception of public responsibility to bear on the conduct of private monopoly;" while more recent analyses forward "a much more critical 'capture' theory, which holds that regulatory agencies almost invariably become servants rather than masters of the industries over which they preside, and that in the rational pursuit of its long term security, business actively sought state regulation to escape the travails of the market," (Nelles 189). However, questions of whether or not regulation was instituted at the behest of industry tend to obscure larger questions regarding the role of the regulatory commission in the economy. As the Privy Council (110) notes:

Regulatory commissions...exists largely because the adjudicative role which they perform could not be performed by departments under the more or less continuous direction of a minister...commissions and tribunals are uniquely constructed to dispense privileges - usually amongst competing interests - and arbitrate rights.

Indeed, in their dispensing of privileges and rights the Board of Railway Commissioners and its progenitors can be seen as dedicated

to the smooth allocation of property rights and the orderly growth and maintenance of private capital. Whether adjudicating between directly competing groups of private capital, or between monopoly capital and the "public interest", they foreground an allocative rationale that focuses on the growth or development of the system within which they are embedded. In fulfilling this role, the regulatory commission constructs a particular set of relations between the state and private capital - relations which are not dependent on the policy stream in which the instrument is located.

Government ownership too was born out of pragmatic necessities in the maintenance of capital accumulation. With the Union Act of 1840, the state became directly involved in the development of economic infrastructure such as canals and railways. Innis (1933: 80) offers a summary of the operational imperative of this activity:

Government ownership is fundamentally a phenomenon peculiar to a new country, and an effective weapon by which the government has been able to bring together the retarded development and the possession of vast natural resources, matured technique, and a market favourable to the purchasing of raw materials. It was essentially a clumsy, awkward means of attaining the end of immediate investment of tremendous sums of capital, but it was the only means of retaining a substantial share of the returns from virgin natural resources. Canada's development was essentially transcontinental. Private enterprise was not adequate to the task, although the success of government ownership has tended to obscure the paramount importance of its contributions during the early stages of capital formation.

Through both subsidy and direct ownership, the early Canadian stage was able to rapidly secure territory and develop resources while deferring the cost of development through legislative structures. The crown corporation represents a further institutionalization of this process.

Fuelled by the unsubstantiated optimism of the federal government in the first decade of this century and the trials of war in the second, the debts of two of Canada's three transcontinental railways had grown beyond the management of the private sector by 1917. After much deliberation, nationalization seemed to be the only way to prevent bankruptcy and the negative effects on both private individuals and Canada's credit in foreign capital markets that might arise from it. The Canadian National Railway (CNR) was the state's response to this crisis.

As a means for the consolidation and public appropriation of private debt the new corporation was quite a success, investors were largely protected and the railways were maintained. However, the structure of the company was not conducive to capital accumulation. On one hand, its assets were a patchwork of isolated railways. While these were important for the maintenance of commercial activities in the communities which they serviced, as commercial enterprises they were marginal at best. On the other hand, the company was saddled with a tremendous debt to service and subject to small and unpredictable Parliamentary appropriations for working capital. As Innis (1933: 58) notes, this structure placed the CNR in a subordinate position to the CPR in relation to both railway markets and advances of new transportation technologies and, over time, would lead it "to become a buffer between the Canadian Pacific and the vicissitudes of railway earnings in Canada." Rather than offering direct competition to private enterprise then, this structure focussed the crown corporation on the edges of the commercial railway system and extended the reach of private capital in the development of national resources. Further to this point, Innis (1933: 55-56) writes:

government ownership at present represents a force in favour of continued and rapid exploitation, and there is little evidence that it is being used, or that it can be used, as a weapon designed for other purposes of importance to the Canadian people in the long run. Government ownership will continue to be a most potent factor in the rapid development of the country.

Historically then, these regulatory instruments sedimented particular sets of relations between the state and private capital in institutional form: the regulatory commission working to safeguard the smooth allocation of resources and expedite the orderly expansion of capital; state ownership, with its focus on commercially marginal activities, working to extend the reach of private capital in the development of resources.¹

THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING

Prang notes that the introduction of public broadcasting to Canada was a move of "defensive expansionism" as the state strove to protect and nurture its broadcasting resources from the intrusion of American broadcasting signals. However, this intervention was not motivated solely by economic concerns, for radio broadcasting was imbued with nationalist cultural significance early in its history. To understand how these cultural concerns structure broadcasting policy, some illustration of the historical significance of the nationalist ideal that gives rise to these concerns and its relation to the Canadian state is necessary.

As Charland (202) illustrates, the early development of the Canadian nation state had both physical and discursive components:

(1) The existence of a transcontinental Canada required the development of a system of transportation facilitating territorial annexation, colonization, and the implantation of a physical presence. (2) The existence of this Canada also required the development of a rhetoric which ideologically constituted those in Canada as Canadians, united in the national project and under the political authority of a national government.

Through constituting a particular set of historical subjects, this discourse constructed the idea of a "Canadian" nation state. Legitimated by this notion of nation, the state was empowered to intervene in the economy and undertake the physical components of nation building. However, once the project of Confederation was firmly underway, this "discourse of nationalism" did not simply disappear. It remained a central legitimating force in underwriting federal initiatives.

While the discourse of nationalism informed the practice of radio broadcasting in the early 1920's, it was not until the Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Aird Report) that it became central to the development of broadcasting policy. Informed by a commercial rationale, private broadcasting in Canada was largely constructed as an extension of American broadcasting empires. This inhibited the growth of a Canadian based industry and raised nationalist concerns. Building on these concerns, the Aird Report (6) stated that radio "could become a great agency in fostering national consciousness and unity" but because of the preponderance of foreign programming available "the minds, ideals, and opinions of Canadians, particularly the young, are being shaped into moulds not specifically Canadian." Here then, the commission implicitly recognized what Innis (1951) would call the "space binding" nature of the new medium. Central to this vision, was a conception of the medium as a purveyor of nationalist cultural ideas the might bind the country together. From Aird on, these nationalist concerns became a central feature of broadcasting policy discussions. These concerns, in concert with the structure of regulation, set up a series of relations between the state, private capital, and the practice of broadcasting - relations which have been instrumental in the marginalization of public broadcasting in Canada.

The struggle for public broadcasting that followed the Aird Report is well documented in the literature and does not need to be rehearsed in detail here. It is generally argued that with the legislation of the 1932 Broadcasting Act and the institution of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) the nationalist forces won the day, (Prang). Indeed, the discourse of nationalism

and its attendant concerns appear to firmly undergird Prime Minister R. B. Bennett's speech to the House of Commons introducing the first Broadcasting Act:

this country must be assured of complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference of influence. Without such control radio broadcasting can never become a great agency for communication of matters of national concern and for the diffusion of national thought and ideals, and without such control it can never be the agency by which consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened....no other scheme than that of public ownership can ensure to the people of this country, without regard to class or place, equal enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of radio broadcasting. Private ownership must necessarily discriminate between densely and sparsely populated areas.... Happily... under this system there is no need for discrimination: all may be served alike. (Cited in Peers 101-102.)

However, in practice, the CRBC fell short of being the "great agency" promised in Bennett's speech.

The CRBC was somewhat of a hybrid of the regulatory commission and crown corporation: on one hand, empowered to regulate private broadcasting; on the other, charged with carrying on the business of broadcasting in Canada.³ This division of responsibilities recognized the legitimacy of private ownership within the system while allowing for public participation. However, positioned as a government department, the commission's powers of self-determination were severely constrained by legislation, particularly regarding the acquisition of property, the appointment of staff, and the acquisition and disposition of funds. Attempts to have the Broadcasting Act amended to provide greater autonomy were to no avail, (Peers 118-128). This structure, which circumscribed the commission's activities in the marketplace and left it open to pressure from both the government and the private sector, focussed the commission's activities toward the edges of the commercial system.

While enough money to make a substantial step toward building a wholly publicly owned broadcasting system was generated through regulation, the CRBC was dependent on the government for passing on these funds and they were not forthcoming, (Peers 108-136). Consequently, the commission's plans to construct a chain of high-powered stations across the country were stymied and most of its

efforts focussed on network broadcasts and program production, (Malone, 31). In those early days, high transmission costs mitigated against network broadcasting in Canada, (Weir 50-55). But because such arrangements were seen as important to the national character of the system, they were undertaken almost single-handedly by the commission.⁴ In an effort to induce broadcasters to run Canadian programming rather than import or copy American programs, the commission produced and distributed programming free of charge. When private stations balked at this prospect, the commission often paid them to affiliate with its networks and/or take on its programming, (Weir 56). Further, because of national considerations, commercially unprofitable service to less populated areas of the country was shouldered by the commission.

In practice then, the CRBC's nationalist vision of broadcasting generally subordinated its activities to the commercial interests of the private stations. In the face of foreign broadcasting incursions, it moved to develop aspects of the Canadian broadcasting resource that private industry was loathe to and subsidize the operation of private stations with both programming and cash during the tough economic times of the early 1930's. The role of the discourse of nationalism is crucial here. For, though constituting nationalist goals for broadcasting, it directed the activities of the commission away from those of private broadcasters. Coupled with a structure that left it open to both budget restrictions and pressure from private broadcasters, these goals narrowed the activities of the commission to those of primary national concern. As a result, the CRBC moved to fill in the void created by the contradiction between the logic of commercialism and the discourse of nationalism and lay the foundation for the development of a Canadian-based broadcasting system. While the form of public broadcasting and its technological conditions have changed through time, the basic relations between the state, public broadcasting, and private capital constructed by regulation have remained the same.

THE EARLY CBC

The 1936 Broadcasting Act transferred the CRBC's regulatory powers to the CBC while clearly distancing it from the government through casting it in the form of an "independent" crown corporation.⁵ But while it had a guaranteed income, the ability to borrow money, and control over its staff, the CBC's powers were still severely circumscribed by the requirements that it have permission from the Governor-in-Council for expenditures over a certain amount, for the acquisition of property, or for securing loans or advances. Because the ability to acquire and dispose of capital is the essence of corporate freedom, the CBC's independence was in practice more of a possibility than an achievement. This structure, combined with its self-espoused national mandate, continued to focus the public broadcaster's commercial, network,

was in practice more of a possibility than an achievement. This structure, combined with its self-espoused national mandate, continued to focus the public broadcaster's commercial, network, and programming policies away from the practices of private broadcasters and toward the development of the national system.

Network activities were again structured in favour of private capital. While network broadcasting in the late 1930's was still not lucrative enough to attract private investment, it continued to form a major portion of the CBC's activities. Private stations formed an important role in this network, filling in large gaps in national coverage. Revenue sharing arrangements for such broadcasts were more generous than those American stations struck with their affiliates, and little if any pressure appears to have been exerted on private stations to join the CBC network or carry CBC programming (Malone 34). As the economic climate improved and the CBC demonstrated the viability of network operations, pressure from the private sector resulted in both an increase in the CBC's national network coverage and the relaxing of network affiliation rules to allow private stations to form their own regional networks.

Through this period the CBC's production practices continued to offer little interference with the private sector. Production often focused on types of programming that were considered to be either culturally enriching or of national significance, such as symphonies and radio plays or "actuality" broadcasts and current affairs. These types of programming were not particularly attractive to advertisers because of their narrow audience appeal and/or expense.⁶ Advertising practices too were different from those of private broadcasters. In an attempt to set a high standard for advertising content, the CBC formulated a commercial acceptance policy which considerably narrowed the types of advertising revenue it would accept. Further, because it perceived itself as a "national" broadcaster, the CBC does not appear to have contracted either local business or spot advertising through the 1940's, leaving this business for private broadcasters (Weir 200-203).

The crown corporation structure also left the CBC both financially and authoritatively ill-equipped to regulate the activities of the private sector. Transgressions regarding commercial activity, content requirement, and promises of performance were often reprimanded yet evaded punishment in the face of unclear authority. These problems continued to grow through the 1940's and were compounded after World War II with the introduction of television in the United States. Until, as Peers (1969: 379) notes, by the year 1948:

several questions demanded the attention from the government. First, an authoritative answer was needed on who should regulate and control the activities of the

private stations; their scope and function had to be defined or restated. Second financial provision had to be made for the CBC; the license fee...was now clearly inadequate... Third, there was the new problem of television. The country, it seemed, would be faced with the same kinds of difficult choices that had confronted it when radio broadcasting developed. The difference was that the pace would be faster, the costs would be greater - and the stakes would be higher.

While the CBC began to make plans for the implementation of television in 1947, these were dealt a serious blow early in 1948 when the government refused them funding. From this time until the legislation of the 1958 Broadcasting Act, the federal government assumed the responsibility for setting television policy, as both public and private broadcasters jockeyed for position in this new broadcasting market.

In early 1948 it looked as though the CBC would be relegated to a licensing and regulatory role regarding television, similar to the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC). However, the applicants apparently most able to proceed were foreign-owned, which raised objections from the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB), (Peers, 1979: 11). Delay followed and Canadian cities were flooded with programming from American border broadcasters.

Under pressure from a number of sources, the government announced an interim television policy in March of 1949. This policy stated that television would be developed by both public and private enterprise, with the CBC establishing stations and production centres in Toronto and Montreal and supplying programming to private stations in other parts of the country. However, these plans were again modified in 1952 when the government, reacting to the nationalist concerns of the Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (Massey Commission) made another major television policy statement:

The government believes, with the Royal Commission, that television should be developed in Canada with the aim of benefitting our national life and that it should have the structure and means required by Canadian conditions to ensure adequate amounts of Canadian programs for Canadians as well as using some of the material from outside the country. Television will undoubtedly play a considerable part in the lives of many Canadian families... The government believes it should be so developed in Canada that it is capable of providing a sensible pattern of programming for Canadian homes with at least a good portion of Canadian content reflecting

Canadian ideas and creative abilities of our own people and life in all parts of Canada, (Fowler Report: 315).

While the nationalist goals of broadcasting contextualized this statement, the system the government envisioned was not a purely public model. This plan moved to establish CBC stations in Ottawa, Halifax, Vancouver, and Winnipeg as well as Toronto and Montreal while leaving other centres open to development by private interests. Only one station would be licensed in any given area and network arrangements, still too expensive to be attractive to private capital, would be the responsibility of the CBC.

The CBC began broadcasting in September of 1952 in Toronto and Montreal, and the first private station opened in Sudbury in October of 1953. From this point television grew extremely quickly. A year and a half later there were seven CBC stations and nineteen private stations. And, by March of 1958, there were eight CBC stations and thirty-six private outlets, (Ellis 35). The CBC supplied much of the impetus to this growth, funnelling \$170,000,000 into the development of television between 1952 and 1957. Much of this money indirectly subsidized the operations of private broadcasters through supplying them with programming and facilities. Further, affiliate agreements between the CBC and private broadcasters operating in economically marginal markets acted as a buffer between these businesses and the travails of market development.

After their election, the Conservatives made good on their longstanding promise to institute an independent regulatory commission in broadcasting with the passage of the 1958 Broadcasting Act. With this Act, the CBC lost control over licensing and network regulation and was set on more or less equal footing with private broadcasters before the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG), competing for licenses and privileges. However, in practice this realignment of power relations was not as dramatic a shift from the status quo as some critics claim. The 1957 Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (Fowler Report: 224) had already recommended the creation of a separate public agency that would be responsible for all matters of regulation. While this report took pains to point out that this was not the same organization as the independent regulatory board advocated by private broadcasters, it did note that before the new board there might be "competition between the CBC and private applicants for new licenses." Further, because the government had acted as an arbiter between the CBC and private interests in the competition for television licenses, the new legislation was in many ways simply legislative recognition of existing regulatory conceptions and relationships.

The allocative rationale of the new board quickly became apparent. As the BBG assumed its responsibilities, the government announced that in mid-September of 1959 applications for second

stations in areas already served with television would be considered. Rising out of this second station policy, an application to operate a private network was heard in April of 1961 and the CTV network began broadcasting in October. As Anderson (84) illustrates, the new stations', and consequently the new network's, success was largely dependent on the degree to which they could "cut into CBC commercial revenues and the amount of programming it could sell to the Corporation's affiliates." While both the new stations and the new network got off to a rocky start, with a little help from the BBG by way of relaxing regulations, the second stations were soon profitable while the CBC reported declines in commercial revenue.

Encouraged by government and its structure as a regulatory board, the BBG had both explicit and implicit mandates to expand the broadcasting system. Throughout its tenure it was almost constantly at odds with the CBC over how such expansion would be undertaken. With the CBC constrained both financially and through its dedication to the national purposes of broadcasting, it was inevitable that this expansion would come at the expense of the public broadcaster.³

THE CRTC

With the 1968 Broadcasting Act, and the institution of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), the relations between the CBC and private broadcasters were little changed. However, with this Act the nationalist goals of public broadcasting finally found voice in legislation and the CBC was officially harnessed to presenting a "balanced service of information" in both English and French, extending service to "all parts of Canada", and contributing "to the development of national unity... (and the) continuing expression of Canadian identity," (Section 3(g)). While the forces at work in the broadcasting system during the 1970's and 1980's have been varied and complex, both the structure of regulation and the CBC's mandate continued to focus public broadcasting toward the edges of the system.

Following an allocative rationale, the CRTC sought to enhance Canadian representation within the broadcasting system during the 1970's by increasing the number of licensees. Generally, this led to a further marginalization of public broadcasting through both intensifying competition for audiences and increasing the amount of foreign programming available within the system. Following its mandate, the CBC fought this tide by increasing its commitment to the production of Canadian programming, extending broadcasting service through its Accelerated Coverage Plan, and devoting increasing attention to issues such as northern and native broadcasting.⁴ As the 1970's drew to a close though, the uncontrolled reception of American satellite broadcasts threatened the whole regulatory framework, (CRTC, 1980). In an effort to head off this latest invasion of American programming, the CRTC

increased its licensing activity further fragmenting broadcasting markets, (CRTC, 1985).

Throughout this period, budget cuts undermined the CBC's abilities to respond to these changes in the broadcasting environment. Since the mid-1970's, recessionary pressures on the state have placed increasing emphasis on the role of the private sector and the supposed benefits of competition, (McNulty 196). Coupled with the increase in private sector representation, these economic forces have further diminished the role of public broadcasting in the system.

As the private sector has continued to fill the broadcasting system with more foreign programming, the CBC has predictably reacted by renewing its commitment to develop a greater quantity of "distinctive" Canadian programming.¹⁰ This strategy is evidenced in how the corporation dealt with the 1991 budget cuts: withdrawing from local news production (ostensibly because this service "duplicates" that of the private sector); promising increased regional news programming (a market now underserved by private broadcasters); and renewing its commitment to "Canadianizing" its program schedule. However, this strategy again finds the public broadcaster emphasizing values that are marginal to the commercial system and it will put a further strain on the CBC's resources. Given that local news and foreign programming have traditionally been major sources of commercial revenue, these cutbacks will bring about both a decline in revenue as audiences shrink and an increase in production costs as new programs are produced.

It is interesting to note how these commitments, with their apparently negative impact on the commercial revenue of the corporation, come at a time when the proliferation of private broadcasting services have severely fractured advertising markets and threatens loss of income to all. However, while there has undoubtedly been pressure from the private sector to push the CBC further away from commercial advertising markets, the greatest impetus in this direction appears to have come from within the corporation itself as it has moved to pursue cultural concerns in the face of increased foreign program incursions and focus on developing aspects of the system that are being overlooked by the commercial rationale of private broadcasters.

CONCLUSION

While the history of broadcasting in Canada has indeed been a history of struggles between competing interests, the structure of regulation has consistently placed the public sector forefront in developing the broadcasting system. First with the CRBC, and later with the CBC, public broadcasting has functioned to both generate and consolidate broadcasting resources. With their abilities to both generate revenue and distribute it to specific sites, these organizations excelled as development instruments. Under their shepherding the private sector flourished, leading to pressure for further allocation of available resources as private capital developed the capacity to undertake more responsibilities.

At the centre of this division of labour between the private and public sectors has been the contradiction between the cultural goals of broadcasting and the economic rationale that guides private capital. Presently, this contradiction is expressed at a number of different levels within the various elements of the system: in the practices of the CBC, where it is torn between the commercial imperatives of broadcasting and the pursuit of broad social and nationalist goals; in the practices of the private sector, where the purchase of cheap foreign programming is favoured over program production; in relations between the private sector, the public broadcaster, and the regulator, where the private sector is generally found to be in a better financial position to assume new licenses than the CBC; and in Parliamentary debates and government studies, where commendations of the public sector are often accompanied by calls for further austerity. These contradictions have moved to frame power relations between the private and public sectors such that the public sector both seeks and is pushed toward the economic edge of the system and a subordinate position with regard to revenue production. However, while the mandate of the corporation will inevitably continue to focus its activities on the economic margins of the system, it need not continue its slow drift to obscurity. Through instituting some form of funding independent of the political and economic fortunes of the state - a form upon which the corporation might generate future revenue opportunities - the CBC could strengthen its position at the leading edge of the broadcasting system.

Endnotes

1. In this way they represent a step in the historical institutionalization of capital relations between the state and private capital. See Dubruc (1966) for a discussion of how the Canadian state has historically moved toward the promotion of private capital accumulation.

2. While the concept of discourse presented here dovetails with Charland's notion of the term there are several important differences, particularly regarding the relationship between rhetoric and discourse and the role of technology in this discourse. For a comparison see Charland (1986: 196-21) and Skinner (1988: 5-24).

3. See Canada. Canadian-Radio Broadcasting Act Statutes of Canada, (C. 51, 1932): Section 8 A.

4. Interestingly, Weir (165) illustrates the CRBC's first network contract with the railroad telegraph companies was sensitive to their commercial interests and contained this clause:

The commission undertakes and agrees not to employ the said transmission lines for commercial broadcasting purposes and agrees not to compete with the railways in the commercial broadcasting field. If, however, the commission hereafter determines to undertake commercial broadcasting, it shall give to the railways and to each of them reasonable notice of its intention so to do and in such an event the commission shall not undertake such commercial broadcasting unless and until the amounts to be paid by the commission to the railways for the use of the said transmission lines for such purposes shall have been mutually agreed upon.

5. Weir (200-203) illustrates how the CRBC's close relationship with government led to its eventual downfall with the "Mr. Sage" scandal.

6. As the general manager of the CBC noted in 1946, scheduling practices often worked in conjunction with program production to minimize audience appeal:

The CBC does not try to obtain a mass audience all of the time. The easy and profitable way of doing this is to put programs which are not supposed to be big audience builders outside peak listening times. This we have resolutely refused to do. (Quoted in Weir 272).

7. See the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Annual Report 1959. Further, Weir (331) notes that "during the first three months of the life of most private television stations, up to 85 per cent of

their programs were supplied by the CBC without cost to them." Also, through lease agreements, the CBC was a major source of financing for the Trans-Canada Telephone System's microwave system and it often shared these channels with the private networks free of charge, (Weir 331).

8. Skinner (1988) offers a thorough discussion of how this expansion took place at the expense of the CBC.

9. Through its interest in the latter, the corporation played an important role in financing the development of satellite broadcasting as Telesat's only broadcasting customer from 1973 to 1981.

10. See for instance: the CBC The Strategy of the CBC 1983; CBC Let's Do It! 1985; CBC New Broadcasting Policy For Canada March 1987.

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ON THE DEVALUATION OF WOMEN'S LABOUR: HEGEMONIC AND LOCAL IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICES

PAUL SHREENAN

Carleton University

INTRODUCTION

The Atlantic region of Canada has a history of underdevelopment beginning shortly after confederation and which continues to the present¹. The particular form of capitalist underdevelopment² which has occurred in the region is one characterized by a heavy reliance on the government sector and also on resource extraction industries like fishing and forestry. The fishing industry presents a complex of relations between levels of state regulatory mechanisms, class conflict, and gender inequality. One particular division, that between inshore and offshore fishing, is important in this paper. Offshore fishing is carried out on large vessels (65 feet and over) owned by large fishing and fish processing companies (e.g., National Sea Products or Fisheries Products International). Small boat fishers with boats under 45 feet in length pursue inshore fisheries including lobster, herring, mackerel, cod and other groundfish when conditions permit. They are versatile, multi-purpose fishers. Small boat fishers operate out of the household unit of production and comprise the mainstay of hundreds of small fishing communities on the whole of Canada's east coast.

In fishing communities, the focus of this paper, women contribute to the family economy through a variety of productive strategies including subsistence production, the informal economy and waged labour (Connelly and MacDonald, 1983:46), yet women's work has consistently been devalued, undervalued or simply ignored by both the scholarly and broader community (Porter, 1987:48). It is in the sphere of domestic labour, both productive and reproductive, that women's work is most undervalued because it is not public/visible and because its contribution has been systematically ignored in terms of the enduring cultural production surrounding the fishing industry and related sea-going cultures. In Brunton et al. (1981) we see, for example, an extensive compilation of song and poetry about the lives of working class (including fisher) Atlantic Canadians over the past century or more. Unfortunately, as the authors are well aware, the material is practically devoid of the presence of women and women's experience except where they are mentioned in a sexist and derogatory way. Cultural production, thus, reflects the kinds of ideological practices which legitimate certain kinds of discourse and render alternate voices inaudible. In this paper I will be concerned, mainly, with the question of how the invisibility of

much of women's labour and its under-valuation is reproduced through ideological practices which legitimate female subordination³. I will examine the ways in which three hegemonic ideological practices (capitalism, liberalism, patriarchy) together legitimate and reproduce this subordination. Then moving from the general to the specific I will introduce an exploratory discussion of a local ideological practice which, though not unheard of in other industries or regions, has manifestations peculiar to small boat fishers.

The purpose of this paper is thus modest; to begin to recognize particular, local forms of knowledge and practice which articulate with other hegemonic practices hence contributing to the reproduction of the subordination of women. I offer an analysis of those ideological practices integral to the reproduction of unequal gender relations in the Maritimes. In particular the focus is on the culture in which small boat fisher families are immersed. It should be stated at the outset that my analysis is an exploratory discussion of gender relations in Maritime fishing communities rather than a comprehensive examination. The analytical focus is, therefore, admittedly theoretical and self-consciously lacking in detailed empirical material. In addition this discussion should not be read as an attack on small boat fishers, their communities, or their ways of surviving. Instead, it is advanced in an effort to recognize gender inequality in this historically specific material and cultural context; to begin to explicitly define one such local ideological practice, what I call the *ideological practice of independence*; and to make some tentative suggestions pertaining to possibilities for social action and social change.

Few studies articulate the actual labour processes of the women of fisher households in the contemporary context. However, in an important case study on women of small boat fisher households in Gloucester, Massachusetts, Clark shows how women's labour is integral to the overall labour processes of small boat fishing. In some circumstances, for example, women may represent the fisher household's interests at the level of political organizing activities, whether these are formally established or not. This may entail lobbying at the local level or at other state regulatory sites. Clark also explains how some women have initiated creative marketing of the catch through marketing a cookbook which spreads the knowledge of local seafood cookery. Women, acting as "land agents" for the household fishing enterprise work to get the best deal possible for the catch by negotiating with more than one buyer; they are, in other words, sales agents for the catch. Fisher women have often stayed in school for significantly longer than their partners, their reading and writing skills are better than their partners' thus enabling them to be more effective managers of particular organizational tasks involved in the fishery. They have been responsible for the negotiation of loans, equipment purchases, bills payment, crew payment, repair arrangements, mortgages, insurance policies and licences (Clark,

1988:264-8). Each of these tasks merits close examination in order to articulate the *nitty gritty* of household production in the age of monopoly capitalism.

As already mentioned my goal here is more modest -- to move toward the recognition of local ideological practices and the development of a theoretical framework which may assist in this area of research. To that end the concepts of hegemony and ideological practice must be introduced.

The concept of hegemony borrowed from Gramsci and developed by others serves as a corrective to the exclusively class determined analysis of orthodox Marxists (Mouffe, 1987). Hegemonic domination in present day capitalist society, or the way in which capital establishes and reproduces its rule is not accomplished through force. Hegemonic rule is always precarious or unstable. Consent or hegemony is produced and reproduced through the institutions and practices of civil society as opposed to being solely enforced through the repressive state apparatus.

The concept of ideological practice is central to the present analysis; practices are ideological when they legitimate relations of inequality¹. As Dorothy Smith points out ideological practices "are pervasive features of the organization of the juncture between the relations of ruling and the actualities of people's lives they organize and govern" (Smith, 1990:43). These practices make social relations intelligible to us although they are systematically selective and incomplete. They tell partial truths, thereby obfuscating the major contradictions that characterize power relations. These concepts will be more fully developed below, but will nevertheless be illuminated here.

What makes certain practices ideological is that they embody highly selective representations of reality. For example, liberal philosophy posits *free* and *equal* individuals; by doing so it defines out of existence a vast array of social structural elements like gender, class, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Furthermore the philosophy posits that all individuals are equal before the law; yet when confronted with the reality of the law, individuals who bring to the court vastly different economic and social resources predictably get vastly different outcomes. In fact, given an historically informed theory of social relations it would indeed be odd if all groups had similar experiences *vis a vis* the law.

Formally equal individuals also freely compete for places in the world of paid work. If we systematically ignore the above mentioned structural differences we can look, for example, at the labour market and assume that any individual is free to take up any occupation given the proper motivation. The divergence between ideological practice and reality is readily apparent. We know that it is neither happenstance, poor individual choices nor biological

programming that push and pull women disproportionately into particular occupations (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978).

HEGEMONIC PRACTICES AND WOMEN'S SUBORDINATION

In this section I will discuss liberal, capitalist, and patriarchal ideological practices each of which includes important constituent relations that contribute to the reproduction of the subordination of women in general. It is, however, only for heuristic purposes that I separate these hegemonic practices; in everyday life they are inextricably intertwined.

Liberalism

Ideological practices make the contradictions between lived experience and the theory disappear by not addressing them. As a later example will illustrate in more detail, the pervasive liberal conception of equality carries a highly specific meaning which is much narrower than other conceptions of equality. One common illustration of the breadth in the potential meaning of equality is posed as the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of condition. The everyday experience of people often points up the contradictions between the purpose of ideological practice and reality, but there remains albeit a limited and selective "truth" to the practice nevertheless. The liberal subject is thus formally free and formally equal; these formalisms are supported by selectively chosen examples (the Fords, Horatio Alger and other dead white males that are part of the cultural baggage of the Americas) which are used to illustrate that "anyone can make it". It is true that these individuals have succeeded; what is ideological in the use of the examples is that the vast majority of hard working people do not make it, and cannot, for structural reasons.

Pervasive though it is, liberalism should be understood as having developed out of a particular historical conjuncture and as a result it embodies a set of practices which are historically specific. So often today analyses utilise a totalizing discourse which confers an almost transhistorical status to the liberal status quo. One of the main tenets of liberalism is that all individuals are equal before the law; this postulate establishes the grounds for another liberal principal, that of, equality of opportunity. In our society, however, the belief in not only the ideal but also the practice of equality of opportunity (and this practice has some major flaws) has served to both obscure and legitimate in significant ways inequality of condition. Since liberal theory posits that all people are free individuals abstracted from society and history, as it were, anyone can simply be or do anything one wants given the proper motivation. Women's oppression in this case may be conceived of as their own fault and the familiar practice of blaming the victim is reinforced.

Liberal feminists contend that women's subordination is reproduced through traditional (i.e. Non-western and therefore by definition non-rational or illiberal) values and their concomitant social structures. This position has certain idealist tendencies which have important consequences for the kinds of political strategies or policy goals that are suggested. In her discussion of liberal feminism (in particular the WID school)⁵, Asoka Bandarage makes reference to the kinds of social and economic strategies of this kind of analysis,

Similar to liberal thinkers in the West, WID thinkers seek this [primarily economic] integration [of women] through legal measures and changes in attitude. To this end many conferences, declarations and legislation including the UN decade for women (1984:498).

There is a problem with these strategies; to the extent that they spend a great deal of time and energy on the changing of attitudes they neglect the more fundamental problem of material conditions. Even legislation, in and of itself, does little to address this problem as has been seen throughout the world where women in industrialised liberal democracies who enjoy *de jure* equal rights remain marginal in terms of ownership and control of resources.

Capitalism

Capitalism is a mode of production which entails a variety of ideological practices. My discussion of capitalism is very much tied to the preceding section on liberalism because the two are inextricably linked historically, as such, in this section I make frequent reference to both liberalism and capitalism. The point of departure for critical, gendered analyses of capitalist society is Engel's treatment of gender inequality in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. In this work Engels drew from notes written by both he and Marx while reflecting on the work of Lewis Henry Morgan who wrote extensive empirical researches on the Iroquois in New York (Leacock, 1973:9). While Morgan was interested in how change occurred in terms of social relations and ultimately developed a typology of stages of human history supporting the unilinear evolutionary theory of his day, Engels had quite a different use for Morgan's empirical data. He used Morgan's work as a basis upon which to develop a more consistent and theoretically informed, materialist understanding of the question of the social change from so-called primitive society onward. Leacock points out that the issues raised by both Morgan and Engels remain the concern of many scholars today. Socialist feminist scholars like Mies (1982:1986) and Eisenstein (1979:43) acknowledge the importance of many of Engels' insights, but reformulate his question about the origins of gender inequality in such a way that it serves to explain the ongoing problem of women's subordination. That is, they ask how women's subordination is

reproduced and attempt to get at questions of reproduction, and the legitimization of subordination.

In a context of regional underdevelopment, distinct from, but in many ways similar to, that experienced by women and the broader working class in the third world, Connelly and MacDonald make the another important link between capitalism and women's subordination,

working class households here always required more than the male wage and [...] women here always contributed to the family household either by intensifying their domestic labour in the home, by earning money through an informal economy, or by participating in the labour force and earning a wage themselves (in Porter, 1987:47).

Since in many cases women's work has been in the home it has remained invisible (and was considered private, domestic and non-productive). When they have gone, or do go, from the household to sell their labour power women's work has, however, been devalued. It has become apparent that this enabled capitalists to exploit women's labour to an even greater extent than has traditionally been the case with men's. The most important international example of this is found in the burgeoning maquiladoras of Mexico; however, the same strategies are in evidence around the world (Elson and Pearson, 1981:92). In part this is where the practice of patriarchal relations is important, but this is the focus of an ensuing section.

In terms of the focus on capitalist production what the above quotation leaves out is the fact that women contribute directly to what is generally thought to be their husband's fishing enterprise. The fact that this is largely ignored may be a result of the structural invisibility of the woman's contribution to what I and others argue must be recognized as the household's fishing enterprise -- not just that of the male fisher (See Klein and Davis, 1988:31-33). This broader perspective on the fishing operation, one that is based in the household unit of production, would be a positive step in challenging the false dichotomy of the public/private work worlds where one is viewed as productive and the other is regarded as natural (Mies, 1982:2-3).

In Canada, for example, the public/private split only occurred with the development of capitalism and eventually with the *de facto* privatization of land across the country. Popular knowledge of this is, however, limited and there seems to be the broad based perception that the public-male/private-female split has always been the way social life has been organized. Once the land was claimed immigrants could no longer go out and enter subsistence production where men and women living in households worked together or separately, but almost always from the household (household production for use-value). They were forced to find work as

labour for capitalist enterprises or government infrastructural projects which ultimately were built to the great benefit of capital.

Several of the characteristics of liberalism were taken up and utilized in the development of capitalism. One example of the interconnectedness of capitalism and liberalism is the particular usage or definition of the concept of equality. Capitalist practice and its ideological use thus overlaps with liberalism (they are in agreement). Each shares the ideal of equality, but as Mina Davis Caulfield points out, the conception of equality which they share has a culturally specific and consequently a very limited meaning. Equality,

was inextricable from the concept of individual achievement in 'free' competition, and never included (except among socialist theorists) the idea of any kind of equal sharing of societal products (1981:202-203).

Caulfield elaborates further on how this cultural ideal of equality (and the widespread belief in this particular definition of equality as the only possible one) acts to conceal the extreme inequality inherent in capitalist society. She offers an important critique of the capitalist definition of equality. What Caulfield does not bring out is the connection between the capitalist and liberal definitions of equality. Fundamentally they rely on a definition of equality which targets equality of opportunity and not that of condition. Equality of opportunity focuses, as Caulfield makes clear, on the freedom of individuals to compete for unequal rewards⁶. The individualist emphasis in capitalism is in many ways an outgrowth of the same emphasis in liberalism which conceives of individuals as existing prior to, or as Jaggar says, "in abstraction from" a society. This leads to the faulty assumption that individuals' needs can be fulfilled without any real impact on others (1983:29). Another contradiction between capitalism and liberalism is apparent when we look at the idea that, in liberal theory, inequality can be eliminated or minimized through reform. From this conceptualization, liberal theory legitimates inequality by suggesting that inequality is an aberration that can be eliminated through education, attitudinal changes, legal reforms and intervention projects (Bandarage, 1984:499) none of which broach the problem of inequality as a structural imperative of capitalism (Bandarage, 1984:500). Both Caulfield and Bandarage bring out important criticisms of liberal theory and capitalism which illustrate how each established beliefs and practices which, understood in culturally specific ways, serve to legitimate the structure of inequality.

Mies points out several major contradictions of capitalism when she discusses the approach which she advocates (socialist feminism) in opposition to the dominant, capitalist and patriarchal

practices. First she points out the ideological nature of the dominant definition of work.

It is thus necessary, regarding the concept of the productivity of labour, to reject its narrow definition and to show that labour can only be productive in the sense of producing surplus value as long as it can tap, extract, exploit, and appropriate labour which is spent in the production of life or subsistence production which is largely non-wage labour done by women (Mies, 1982:3).

What Mies argues here and elsewhere is that traditionally defined "women's work" is the fundamental precondition of all other work including that involved in capital accumulation. Women, then, can be conceived of as productive and exploited even though they appear external to the direct processes of capital accumulation. In fact they are not external, but are intimately connected to the system through their labour. To the extent that women's work is considered private and nonproductive their subordination under capitalism is reproduced through a systematic ignorance of the material base of the actual system; it therefore becomes, as Mies points out, "a mystification" (1982:4) which legitimates women's subordination, thus the practice is ideological.

Classical or orthodox Marxist accounts of productive work also offer little room for analyses of work which does not take place under the classical capitalist relations of production: where surplus value is directly extracted from the labour of the dispossessed worker. Other forms of work which do not directly produce surplus value as a result fail to pass the test of the definition of "productivity". As has been pointed out this is often the bulk of the work done by women. The effect of defining work in this way is important in terms of reproducing the subordination of women because it reinforces the widespread dualistic notion of private and public work stratified by gender. There are those who argue that the underlying use of dualisms (i.e., as in the work of Levi-Strauss) is itself a product of male modes of analysis (Daly, 1978:11). However, the use of dualisms often relies on naturalistic explanations of gender differences which see, for example, the family and women's traditional role within it as products of biological differences and therefore their legitimization relies on a functional analysis of nature shaping the human social order (Barrett, 1985:199).

The Ideological Practice of Patriarchy

In the broadest terms, patriarchal ideological practices may be defined as social relations in which women tend to exist in an unequal and subordinate power relation *vis a vis* men. In explaining patriarchal relations the view that male dominance is biologically determined is widespread among both anti-feminists and feminists. Anti-feminists see women's subordination (although they

would not call it that) as designed by nature; therefore; it cannot even be conceived as oppressive (Jaggar, 1983:88-89). Anti-feminists often adopt a scientific discourse to explain women's inequality as natural. In Gough's analysis she unmasks the implications of such naturalistic, and biologically determinist, theories;

A "scientific" argument which states that all such features of female inferiority are instinctual is a powerful weapon in maintaining the traditional family with male dominance (Gough, 1975:58).

Gough is critical of anthropologists who attempt to establish a scientific basis for a theory of gender inequality in humans; however, the critique works equally well when applied to capitalism because it is under capitalism that the rational, scientific model heavily influenced by the ideological practice of patriarchy, has been largely developed and tested.

Radical feminists like Firestone (1970) and Brownmiller (1976) also consider biology to be the determining factor in their own analyses of, for example, the division of labour by sex and rape respectively. A variety of criticisms have been levelled at analyses which favour biological determinism. Among the most problematic assumptions made by those who accept biological determinism is the fact that such a position makes social change highly unlikely if not impossible because of the "fact" of this biological or natural inequality.

In her discussion of the lacemakers of Narsapur, Maria Mies shows how the system of capitalist production built upon previously existing patriarchal practices and beliefs to transform the lives of the Kapus, a peasant agricultural caste, and some Christian women. As the industry developed women became segregated in the production jobs while men captured the jobs of agents -- which gave them access to the actual site where the value of the women's labour was realized. In this way the women's labour was exploited. The reason that was given for women's exclusion from the activity of agent was that they were not mobile enough since, among other things, they could not ride bicycles due to local social traditions (1982:10). Such beliefs about what is socially acceptable are effective ideological and material barriers to women's emancipation,

The tenacity with which women cling to these oppressive [patriarchal] norms, because they are symbols of a bygone higher status ... is the ideological and psychological base on which a new phase of exploitation can be built (Mies, 1982:13).

Similar methods of social control and gender oppression are evident in the fisher society of Atlantic Canada. One researcher

relates how women in the fishing communities of Newfoundland formerly had a higher status because their work was more directly related to production,

The older women are guided by the past in much the same way as the men, and they too defer to the identity of "fisherman" ... Their role as fishermen's wives has vanished. Not only are there no fish to be dried on flakes [drying racks], but virtually all other aspects of their past lives have gone as well (Porter, 1988:175).

The tendency to want a return to the old norms which guided life is evident as Porter indicates. We must recognize, however, that such practices offer hierarchical, gender inequalitarian based definitions of women and men. For example, the idea that the man is the head of the household in fisher society, as in India, legitimates such things as the knowledge that women's sphere of activity is in the house, and more broadly, it can legitimate the unequal gender division of labour. Finally, it is evident that material interests underlie these ideological practices.

Although Porter makes useful reference to the desire to maintain the norms of a bygone era, I think she over-states the case when she says that "virtually all other aspects of their lives have gone as well". In the past women's labour may have been more visibly a part of the fisher household's production. In contrast to Porter what I am emphasizing here is the extent to which women's labour remains an indispensable, albeit ignored, component of contemporary household production. Women in small boat fisher households are not left with nothing to do, rather with the concentration on production for exchange-value, women's labour (connected to the household's fishery activities) has become less visible, but it has not ended.

To expand on this, I would suggest that the development of capitalism has distorted the labour processes of women such that the content of their labour has changed, but not necessarily the amount. They have in some cases been left with a much less public role within the family of the fishing household; for example, most fish processing is now done in specialized processing plants -- that job, as a productive household or community-based activity, is no longer available. Since processing work is almost always seasonal women's public exposure through this sort of work changes accordingly. The point here is that while the demands of capitalism have changed the process of production immensely, it has left women in a less powerful position, but not a less integral one.

Southwest Nova Scotia's "Independent" Small Boat Fishers: Culture and Class in a Harsh Environment

In this section I will examine another ideological practice which helps to legitimate and reproduce the subordination of women in various parts of the Atlantic Provinces. The sub-region of southwest Nova Scotia is of interest here as a kind of precursory case study. The dominant ideological practice in southwest Nova Scotia, especially prevalent in the powerful fishing community (fishers, processors and suppliers inclusive), comprises a brand of laissez-faire capitalist and petty bourgeois production (Clement, 1986). This practice is distinctly free enterprise in relation to the rest of the province and the region. In practice however, even southwest Nova Scotia's fishers analyze the system based on their own constellation of interests and objectives. Like other groups they selectively reject laissez-faire policies when it is in their interests to do so. In instances where fishers have felt threatened by a particular group or perhaps a state policy they have mobilized in order to circumvent the strictly laissez-faire operation of the market. Special social programs represent the most obvious state interventions taken at the behest of fishers; examples include, special loans for vessel replacement and unemployment insurance considerations, but virtually all state policies affect the market in some way. Under such circumstances fisher families, like many other actors in the economy, are often unwilling participants in a hegemonic practice, namely capitalism and they attempt to make the best of their situation -- sometimes successfully, sometimes not.

As explained earlier, small boat fishing tends to be gender stratified activity with men tending to do the fishing and women being involved in a variety of on-shore labour processes. Typically, a male fisher has formal ownership of the boat and crews are made up of family members whenever possible. Otherwise close friends or neighbours crew boats on a share of the catch basis (Clement, 1986:27,29,32; Brym and Sacouman, 1979). In his discussion of some of the contradictions between fishers' view of their work and the reality of their work, Davis clearly gives his analysis of the contribution that the fishing labour process makes toward the fisher's ideological practice of independence,

Fishing boats and gear are formally the property of their users. The units of production are self-contained small-scale and individually operationalized in an often risky environment. All of the work tasks in each unit of production are generally completed by its crew members. Fishing incomes are solely derived from the production strategies and the expenditures of each unit of production. In short, small boat fishing is in many ways characterized by the independence and the individuality of each crew. Moreover, attributes of production strategies lend a sense of inter-boat competition to some

of the activities, e.g., lobster fishing. The fishermen's ideology of self reliance and rugged individualism is in these ways reflective of aspects of their real experiences (1984:435).

Fishers clearly have a material basis for the ideological practice of individualism and "independence". However, it has been constructed on a highly selective basis. The influence of patriarchal practice is evident in Davis' quotation in that the work task description has excluded virtually all work that does not take place at sea. Again, in the highly gender stratified society of the fishing communities this, by definition, excludes most, if not all, of the work women do. By ignoring the contribution of women the ideological practice of independence is reproduced along with women's subordination. The labour process, as just outlined, is one characterized in some instances by autonomy or "self-dependence", but not independence. It is true that fishers decide when, how, where, and how hard to work. They do not make, however, these "autonomous" decisions as though they were extracted from the exigencies of daily survival as fishers or as members of households -- outside forces affect their decisions and these include the need to turn a profit which in practice translates into catching enough fish, and selling it, at the going rate of fish per kilogram or tonne to reproduce the enterprise. Women's role in affecting the decisions that fishers make have also traditionally been ignored by scholars (Porter, 1987:45) as well as by the state and capital.

At the level of the market where oligopsonistic and paternalistic relations abound (Kearney, 1983) between fishers (sellers) and merchants (buyers/processors) the ideological practice of independence ceases to function. In that context the bases of the fisher's sense of independence, the product of their labour, and the romantic, idealist notions of fisher "independence" produced in patriarchal culture and folklore are unmasked before the harsh material forces of market exchange. The glorification of the male culture of fishers is an important part of the ideological practice in the Maritimes where the male culture is often characterized as engaged in a taming the natural "she-world".

The peculiar strain of the ideological practice characteristic of southwest Nova Scotia, with its perhaps more adamant than average free enterprise position, is more completely understood when we also consider the cultural ties or the historical linkages between the area and New England. The local adherence to the individualism of laissez-faire capitalism is, in effect, a function of these two primary influences -- the material base of fishers at the level of labour process and the New England connection. New England's historical economic and cultural\ideological domination of southwest Nova Scotia established conditions which clearly fostered a cultural climate amenable to their free enterprise practice.

In the market exchange the unequal and antagonistic nature of relations (fishers dependent on a few buyers for the purchase of their catch) is de-emphasized in the local culture; instead, paternalistic relations between them often legitimate these inequalities in conjunction with the hegemonic ideological practices: capitalism/liberalism'. Fishers are relevant here in two particular respects. First, fishers' labour is commodified in the fish that is caught, consequently when they sell their fish they are actually, at some level, selling their labour power. In the same labour process women's organizational labour is also commodified in the fish which is caught; this is so because their labour is socially necessary. Socially necessary labour or abstract labour, as opposed to individual labour in any given firm, is defined in terms of units of time and entails "the labour time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society" (Marx, 1986:46-47). We also know that Marx and many others regard certain practices as productive which at first glance do not seem to be. Consider, for example, the case of manufacturing. Actual manufacturing is proceeded by organizational labour processes in which raw materials must be purchased, the labour that goes into this is thus socially necessary, as is women's organizational labour in the fisher household. Furthermore the distribution of the product is regarded as productive. So too I would argue is organizational labour in fishing which is broader than the simple labour process of casting nets or laying traps and later pulling them in. Nevertheless, the value of a commodity appears only as the exchange ratio between the commodity in question and the money commodity in a particular exchange and at the time of sale the social relations which produced the commodity are not readily apparent, except to the producer. In this way women's labour is obscured through a form of commodity fetishism. That is, the sales transaction is allowed to reify relations between commodities, while relations between producers and buyers are conceptualized as free transactions unencumbered by enduring social relations of either a classed or gendered character.

Secondly, because of the oligoponistic nature of the fish markets, which are inextricably linked to and are part of the capitalist system, "freedom" is limited to such an extent that it is equated with coercion, i.e., sell on the oligoponistic market, even if you are not being paid the real value for your fish, or get out of the industry. The fisher, and for that matter the entire household, is in a position similar to that of any other worker under capitalism. They are *freely compelled* to sell their labour (commodified in the fish they catch) or not sell it and take no income.

One other important characteristic of the ideological practice of independence is the underlying misogyny which structures the gendered division of labour. For a variety of local cultural reasons women rarely take part in the fishing (Porter, 1988:170;

Davis, 1984). Several instances of this are noted in Faris (1972:73). For example, women may not be permitted to set foot on the boat for fear of "polluting" the vessel for the day. Such social prohibitions⁷ additionally serve to perpetuate women's devalued and subordinated status within the household by clearly situating the means of production in the hands of the male. The fact that women's contribution to their household's fishing enterprise is minimized or ignored completely is, as I have argued, partly a manifestation of the hegemonic ideological practices discussed in the first section and also the local fisher variant. There is relatively little work done on what I have termed here the "ideological practice of independence" specific to Atlantic fishers. One of its most striking facets is the exclusion of women from its analysis and the lack of attention to women's work which contributes directly to the fishing enterprise of the household. It is slowly becoming recognized that, historically, women's labour was important in the mercantilist (or salt-cod) era of fishing. Ellen Antler wrote an important piece on women's historical, though often hidden contribution, to production in the Newfoundland fisheries as well as producing a wide variety of use values for subsistence. In it she estimated,

that the process of drying fish added \$2400 (1950 values) to the value of the seasons catch in Labrador, and \$1500-2000 (1969 values) in Conception Bay. In all Antler suggested women contribute around 35% of the family income in direct, measurable economic values (Porter;1987:45).

Equally important as Porter indicates is the fact that Antler's analysis finally made visible the economic activity of rural women which, to that point, had been ignored by male analysts. However recognizing past sins is easier than admitting those of the present. Nevertheless recognition is slowly emerging as to the extent of the contribution to the fisher household by women today (Connelly and MacDonald, 1990).

Since there is little research that deals specifically with the issue of women's labour in fishing, empirical evidence of their participation is difficult to locate. My own research points to some trends already mentioned. During field work in the summer of 1989 I was able to discuss with a lobster fisher, albeit superficially, the question of the household as a unit of production and the gendered division of labour that existed therein. In this discussion, the male fisher while admitting that his spouse's labour was important attempted to minimize it by making light of it:

PS: When you do your income tax or your inventory of how much you've spent on equipment ... does your wife do that?

Fisher: Oh yeah she does it ... in fact she gets paid year round for doing it ... she gets to live with me.
(Southwest Nova Scotia Interviews, June 23, 1989).

The underlying relations of ruling are made apparent and the ideological practice of independence is shown to be in effect even at the level of casual conversation. Unfortunately what barely gets recognized in the informal context of casual conversation is ever more difficult to recognize and legitimate in public discourse.

Subsistence activities were undertaken by each partner during other times of the year, but during the fishing season both partners, not only the male, contributed to the fishing enterprise. The woman I spoke with did what she modestly called "book-keeping" and was therefore instrumental in terms of budgeting, maintenance decisions, crew payment and outfitting (i.e. equipment purchasing). The problem of recognition, however, requires discussion in a theoretical light which will make visible that which much past theoretical and empirical work made invisible. Additional fieldwork is planned to explore this.

Women's labour is commodified in the fish they make it possible to catch. What I attempt to highlight is the diversity of labour processes which are included in the term "domestic labour"; and the way in which this term slides women's decidedly productive labour into the category of unproductive or domestic labour. Through this I attempt to problematize fisher women's productive and reproductive labour and sketch the kinds of considerations that must inform a fully developed analysis. The requirement therefore is to begin to recognize and value women's decidedly productive labour and to formally differentiate it from other domestic labour while at the same time attempting to change the fact of women's sole responsibility for domestic labour. In terms of the ideological practice of independence, the women of fisher households are caught in a difficult position. Their unpaid work is not recognized as contributing to fishing and as long as their work is not recognized as productive they remain subordinate in the household unit of production.

CONCLUSION

At the level of praxis, women are developing strategies which may begin to break down the exploitative elements of the ideological practice of independence. One such strategy would be to take an active part in gaining recognition of their work. This might be done at the individual level by encouraging more women to go to the dock side to be part of the fish sales process. In this way women would be part of the process in which the value of the catch is realized; their contribution would be concretized. I think this might be a significant material change in circumstances. It would perhaps change the woman's role from that of isolated,

powerless and dependent worker in the household domain to that of equal partner/actor in the realization of the household's material well-being. Initially such a transformation would have to be negotiated at the level of the individual. Notwithstanding some imminent structural transformation in both gender and class relations it seems to me to merit some consideration. This practice of course has been happening in some areas (Clark, 1988:267) and it has an admittedly double-edged characteristic. While it would help to concretize the labour of the women it adds yet another task to women's already double-burdening responsibility for reproductive labour in the home. Another facet of this strategy would have to include a redistribution of reproductive domestic labour -- not an easy challenge.

As in the Gloucester example, women may establish their own organization where they could act at a political level in their own and their household's interests. Another possible strategy might be for women to struggle for a place within the local fisher's associations or the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU). At present the MFU only allows certain types of fishers in the union and all of them actually have to be "doing fishing"; however, some other fishing unions encompass both "shore/plant" and "at sea" workers (e.g., NFFAWU -- Newfoundland Fisherman, Food and Allied Workers Union). If this approach were adopted the union would have a greatly expanded membership. On the other hand it would have to begin to address the very real issue of women's subordination in fisher households.

Endnotes

1. Thanks are due to Jared Keil and Mary-Anne Kandrack for comments on early and later drafts respectively.
2. For a variety of positions discussing the meaning of underdevelopment in Atlantic Canada see Brym and Sacouman, 1979.
3. Things ideological here are defined in a way that has been termed critical by Thompson who points out that ideology "is essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power - that is the process of maintaining domination" (1984:4).
4. Dorothy Smith (1990) calls these "relations of ruling" and others have different names for such relations. See Armstrong and Armstrong (1990); Thompson (1984).
5. Women in Development (WID).
6. Jaggar (1983:62) points out the contradiction inherent in the liberal focus on equality of opportunity; equal opportunity to compete for unequal rewards is impossible to achieve as long as rewards are conspicuously unequal.
7. Initial fish processing work used to be organized and controlled by women in a community based labour process.
8. Although the capitalist mode of production and its many underlying practices derived from the practice of the theory of liberalism this is not to say that the two are, in fact, unproblematically compatible. See for example Mcpherson on the contradictions between capitalism and democracy. In practice liberalism has clearly served as a legitimating force for capitalism.
9. As noted in a previous example Mies gives of the prohibitions that certain women should not ride bicycles.

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HISTORICAL MATERIALISM BY CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY DESIGN: THE LIMITS OF E.O. WRIGHT'S STUDY OF CLASS STRUCTURE

DAVID S. HUBKA
Carleton University

INTRODUCTION

Few sociological debates have generated as much interest as those dealing with Marxist or neo-Marxist class analysis. The most discussed and critiqued contribution to this area in the past decade has been that of E.O. Wright (e.g. Wright, 1978; Wright, 1986a). Wright's project has undergone a number of significant revisions and reformulations, as Wright has continually acknowledged and incorporated suggestions by his critics (see Wright, 1989). This discussion will first review Wright's attempts to extend Marx's analysis of class. Though the author is supportive of Wright's general project to seek high levels of Marxist theoretical integration (1989, p.277), it is argued that this integration is limited by a theory of history based on a flawed thesis of structural determinacy with respect to class. While Wright's efforts are specifically and admirably in the interests of 'grand theorizing' (i.e. viewing class structures as macro-level societal properties), his research focus is on micro-level mechanisms related to individual class positions (pp.274-278). Though much discussion elsewhere deals with this and other issues related to Marxist theories of history, the work of Marxist historian Derek Sayer is presented as an example effective in emphasizing the shortcomings of Wright's analysis. In sum, Wright's practice of placing class position as causally prior to other variables related conceptually to authority, autonomy and property in a cross-sectional survey design provides less of a basis for emancipatory strategy than do traditional Marxist attempts to explain class through historical analysis. The most optimistic prospects for Wright's efforts are finally argued to be in repeating his research in the future, thereby providing a basis for addressing historical evolutions in capitalist class relations.

In his most recent work, Wright (1989) considers a full range of the many criticisms directed at his conceptualization and analysis of class structure. His first assertion is that class as a fundamental determinant of social change is "at the core of Marxian class analysis" (p.269). Theoretical impulses arising from this core feature are, as Wright sees it, torn between developing either simple or complex models of class structure in order to enhance its explanatory power. To occupy class location is thereby for Wright to be affected by a set of mechanisms which limit

individual capacities to make choices and act (p.275). These mechanisms for Wright generate empirically observable effects, one of which is the capacity for collective action (p.280). This derives partially from a model of class in which individual consciousness comes about through commonly lived experiences (in this case jobs) and the theoretical assumption that class structure shapes class conflict (p.286). Wright seems limited in many ways to describing how, in a single historical instance of class relations, classes represent exploitative relations. Marxist emancipatory strategy, on the other hand, can be argued as best achieved by explaining class relations through historical analysis, rather than by explaining various individual conditions by class position through a cross-sectional survey design.

Wright (1986a) contends that Marx's original theory is polarized between analysis of abstract structural maps and concrete conjunctural maps (p.6). The first of these is a structural account of class positions, while the second is concerned with the collective struggles of individual actors. Marx, according to Wright, failed to systematically define and elaborate a concept of "class" (ibid.) and thus provided little basis for linking these polarized elements of structure and action. Despite this, recent theory and research has attempted to bridge this gap between the concrete and the abstract. Wright (1986a) describes the first of these neo-Marxist attempts as dealing directly with the problem of the "new middle class" (p.8). The second of these attempts has focused on processes of class formation. These processes have been characterized through institutional mechanisms which are largely autonomous from class structure, for example, political ideology (ibid.). In general, neo-Marxist theory has attempted to reconcile traditional Marxism with contemporary sociological class theory. Wright's work (e.g. 1978; 1989) has also focused on this reconciliation, and has in this way made significant contributions to neo-Marxist debate. It is in this spirit of theoretical integration that the present discussion weighs Wright's approach with that of a more historically oriented method.

Wright's class theory (1978, 1986a) motivated the design of the survey used in the machine-readable data file: Class Structure and Class Consciousness: merged multi-nation file (1986b). This project was intended to provide data for comparative research of relational dimensions of inequality with special emphasis on authority, autonomy, and property. While providing the basis for scores of interesting studies, it can be argued that these data provide Wright little basis for asserting macro-level theoretical claims. It is argued in the present paper that this limitation is a result of Wright's failure to adequately specify historicity within the context of class formation and the potential for large scale social change. Wright's theory of history is next reviewed, and counter-arguments are presented.

THE HISTORY OF EMPTY PLACES

Wright (1986a) typifies Marx's analysis of class as elaborating 1) Abstract Structural Maps: The determination of a structure of empty places in class relations which are devoid of people and 2) Concrete Conjunctural Maps: The manner in which the people occupying these empty places organize in class struggle. He argues that Marx emphasized only the second of these analyses: "While he gives us a list of descriptive categories, corresponding to the actual actors in the conflicts, he does not provide a set of precise concepts for decoding rigorously the structural basis of most of those categories" (p.7). Wright's purpose is thus to carry on Marx's work, 'filling in' the elaboration of these abstract structural maps, in order to develop an 'effective correspondence' between the two levels of analysis (p.8).

Wright thus proceeds to apply concepts derived from historical analysis, without himself carrying out historical analysis. He contrasts Poulantzas and Skocpol, claiming that while Poulantzas argues that the level of abstraction of mode of production is sufficient to characterize the historical association of class and state, Skocpol rejects the validity of this level of abstraction, and argues for a "strictly historical (i.e. conjunctural)" analysis of the relationship of the state to class structure (1986a, p.12). Both, claims Wright, are theorizing on the same level of abstraction - that of the level of social formation. In Marxist analysis, according to Wright, social formation equates to mode of production. For Wright, mode of production is hence at the core of the Marxist theory of the "developmental stages" of capitalism (p.17). Given that these stages are in fact "a specific kind of general structural property" (ibid.), the level of abstraction of the mode of production is, for Wright, effective in analyzing historical stages of development.

By combining conceptually four historic modes of production, Wright develops a typology of interpenetrated forms of production. He is then able to identify divergent phases of capitalism, and to thereby provide a range of possible immanent phases (Wright, 1983). Wright furthermore discredits Marx for failing to develop this so-called 'legitimate' form of historical materialism. In focusing on the historical conditions of the formation of "concrete class organizations, parties, shop floor organization unions," Marx is argued to have 1) neglected the structural conditions of class: "institutional variability in class relations in given jobs" (p.9), and furthermore to have 2) failed to develop a link between theorized conjunctural class formation and undertheorized conjunctural class structure (p.13).

In proposing a 'Theory of History' Wright (1986a) provides a "Typology of class structures, exploitation, and historical transitions" (p.115). The types of social formation in this typology are sequentially feudalism, capitalism, statism, socialism

and communism. Wright also provides the 'historical task of revolutionary transformation'. These in turn represent respectively increasing levels of emancipation: individual liberty, socializing means of production, democratization of organizational control, substantive equality, and self-actualization. These increasing levels of emancipation, he claims, represent the conditions by which successful transition to the next stage may be made. The probability of achieving his tasks depend directly on the level of the development of productive forces on each level (p.116). His trajectory of future societies is thus probabilistic, as it is contingent on a set of preconditions (ibid.). The historical transitions outlined by Wright's version of historical materialism are consequently not 'iron laws', but rather provides a range of possibilities which depend on the class structure at each given stage.

This is claimed to be an effective modification of traditional historical materialism, which argues: "whenever a transition from one form of class relations to another becomes historically possible, forms of class struggle will develop that guarantee that some transitions will occur" (Wright, 1986a, p.117). In developing a thesis specifically of "Capitalism's Futures", Wright takes to task rescuing historical materialism from this iron-clad law of history: "one of the central thrusts of historical materialism has always been that historical development occurred along a single developmental trajectory... it is for this reason that historical materialism is often considered a teleological philosophy of history with one final state inexorably pulling social change towards it" (Wright, 1983, p.122). Arguing for a new structural mode of production: "statism", Wright claims to effectively show that there is not one future to capitalism (socialism), but in fact two (socialism and statism). The structural determination of capitalism's futures thus becomes a probabilistic determination rather than an inexorable determination.

Not only does Wright claim to rescue historical materialism from its surfeit of determinacy, but also increases the revolutionary strategist's level of certainty. The primacy of productive relations remains the key to social change, given that this power structure determines the manner in which essential resources can be used: "the decisive alternatives that are historically possible revolve around the system of production and appropriation" (p.123). Thus, in the event of "revolutionary rupture", an active, conscious effort must be made to prevent a restoration of both capitalist power and statist power. Invaluable to the revolutionary is this guide to the 'actual patterns of social change' not readily provided by an unmodified historical materialism (p.123).

It can be argued, on the other hand, that Marx's method supports neither an iron-clad law of history, nor a probabilistically contingent one. The charges that Marx's

interpretation of history promotes iron-clad laws, resulted partially from the fact that his method of presentation differs from his method of inquiry (eg. Sayer, 1979, pp.96-103). Marx notes: "(inquiry) has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connections. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully... it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction" (Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, p.92). "What is designated with the words 'destiny', 'goal', 'germ', or 'idea' of earlier history is nothing more than an abstraction from later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history" (ibid., p.74).

There is evidence that Marx was hostile toward interpretations of his work as advocating a generalized model of historical determinacy. In rebutting such an interpretation, Marx charges the author with taking out of context incidental texts and "transforming (his) historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophical theory of the general course fatally imposed on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves placed..." (Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, pp.69-70). Gramsci's criticisms of Bukharin are also suggestive here. Bukharin's division of Marx into two components: 1) "a theory of evolution appearing as sociology" and 2) "a philosophy which amount to crude materialism", leads to an empty typology of historical forms. "Separated from the theory of history and politics, philosophy cannot be other than metaphysics, whereas the great conquest in the history of modern thought, represented by the philosophy of praxis, is precisely the concrete historicization of philosophy and its identification with history" (Gramsci, 1971, p.436).

If one accepts this as a viable interpretation, Marx's methods and conclusions seem opposed to rather than elaborative of those suggested by Wright. Production as an historical abstraction is a theme common among Marxist scholars, but is itself "multiply divided and diverges into different determinations", and as such facilitates the identification of divergent, more concrete features of these abstract continuities (Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, p.74). While all historical epochs have different determinations of production, they also have certain common determinations. This is given by the very nature of production as an historical continuity (p.74-75). The labour process is the production of use-value, which is necessary for affecting exchange of matter between people and nature. This necessity implies that the production of use-value is common to every phase of human existence. This continuity, however, is not the entire picture and indeed, is not even the most crucial part, in that it fails to provide the differing social conditions of the production of use-value (for example slavery, capitalism or hunting and gathering). From this position, one can assert that Marx's method involves somewhat more

than identifying a rigid model of production relations and that, in fact, such models could only form a single level of abstraction useful only in defining a common aspect from which essential differences can be further concluded. Marx claims: "success will never come with the master-key of a general historico-philosophical theory, whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical" (ibid., p.73).

Yet three traditional Marxist theses are redefined according to Wright's "sympathetic" modifications. The first rejects the traditional view (Marx's own) that "socialism is the immediate imminent future capitalism", given that such a transition would necessitate the equalization of two "exploitation assets": means of production and organization (1986a, p.117). There is clearly no logical necessity for these to simultaneously occur, and hence Wright concludes that both statism and socialism are possible futures to capitalism. Second, Wright argues that other classes have the potential to carry out revolution, and hence refutes the Marxist opinion that "the proletariat are the only bearers of a revolutionary mission within capitalism" (ibid.). Third, Wright claims to show that socialism, contrary to Marx, has a "distinctive form of exploitation". Marx, he claims, argued that socialism is not a mode of production and merely constituted an intermediate step to communism (p.118). These three modifications do not, according to Wright, undermine the important notion of progression in Marx's view of historical trajectory, and consequently supposes to retain support for Marx's claims (p.118).

Wright (1986a) provides a typology of exploitation relations which correspond to specific class structures, described as "essentially a typology of modes of production" (p.109). He admits, however, that no society has only one form of exploitation. In order to better characterize the form of exploitation observed in societies, Wright provides three "axes of variabilities", which typify the unique combinations of types of exploitation: 1) "relative weight" of exploitation, 2) the degree of linkage of exploitation to "internal" or "external" relations, and 3) the degree to which various exploitations "overlap" or are "distinct" from each other in a given society.

Given the possible combinations of four modes of production, which necessarily involves four types of exploitation (feudal, capitalist, statist, or socialist), Wright attempts to operationalize the "relative weight" of these exploitations. He first rejects the Marxist notion that one or another form of exploitation must remain the "dominant mode", on the basis that two or more forms may in fact carry equal weight in a single society (p.109). Possible operationalizations of relative weight are then identified as 1) "the relative, aggregate magnitudes of... appropriations of social surplus based on property rights by owners of different exploitation-generating assets", 2) "a measure of the 'class power' of those who appropriate surplus", 3) the degree to

which the dominant mode is functionally associated with subordinate modes and 4) the "dynamic effects of different exploitations" (p.109-111).

Wright then proceeds to argue for the fourth approach, but claims that due to the "theoretical underdevelopment of our understanding of the dynamics rooted in each of the forms of exploitation other than capitalism, let alone the possibility of distinct 'laws of motion' forced by distinct combinations of these forms of production" it is overly difficult to operationalize this notion of exploitation (p.112). Wright provides no means of identifying the degree to which types of exploitation overlap, or are distinct from one another. He does assert, however, that in societies where an overlap occurs, a higher degree of class polarization exists. Implied in this is the notion that multiple forms of exploitations, as reflected in class structure, can have an additive effect on class struggle when combined in the same society.

Wright's form of structural causality is neither linear (historic), nor expressive (i.e. reducing the constituent parts to an essence of totality), but rather represents a causality "imminent" in its effects. Though supposing to contribute to conjunctural, historical analysis through survey method, Wright is limited by the historical specificity of cross-sectional data. His model of class structure derives from Marx's historical analysis of the development of capital, but is reduced to expressing the constituent elements of capital (e.g. class structure, class struggle, class consciousness) within a recursive, cross-sectional causal model.

Cohen (1982) comments on the demise of Marxian sociology: "despite the variety of theoretical strategies and political positions that make up the spectrum of neo-Marxian class theory, an unreflective relation to the Marxian original is characteristic of them all" (p.2). In contesting the theory of class boundaries advocated by Poulantzas and Wright, she remarks: "The analysis always proceeds from the side of 'structure', juggling and elaborating categories ad infinitum in order that they might mesh with the 'realities' of social stratification. Yet it is unclear whether these realities are simply given, or, worse, derived from the structures themselves. Since the old class concepts and prejudices are presupposed from the onset, the key dilemma endemic to any class theory based on *Das Kapital* cannot even be posed" (p.10).

Schmidt (1981) represents another opposition, and identifies the dominant lack of interest in history as not simply the demise of current western sociology, but also as a function of the progress of bourgeois society (pp.1-2). A generalized loss of historical consciousness, leads to a failing conception of the nexus of past and future. This further undermines a comprehension

of the causes of present conditions, and delimits the role of individual agency in effecting future states. Wright's analysis of cross-sectional data permits no explanation of the causes of present class structure, and provides no evidence that present exploitative relations are not in fact natural and eternal.

Wright attempts in this sense not even a crude historiographic analysis, but rather proposes a series of hypotheses to be tested within historically decontextualized data. Wright relies on historical analysis only to the point that Marxist analysis has already provided him with static class categories. Failing to incorporate historical data, Wright's form of statistical method is not justified by, but rather tends to require the causal determinacy of class structure. Wright's method in effect does not conform to, but rather opposes the logic of historical materialism.

CLASS STRUGGLE BY CLASS STRUCTURE

The criteria for developing his model of class structure, claims Wright (1986a, pp. 27-37), is based on six constraints: 1) class structure imposes limits on class formation, class consciousness and class struggle. This constraint does not imply that class structure exclusively determines class formation, class consciousness, and class struggle (p.29), but does necessitate the conception of a causal association of class structure on these other elements of class: "The argument that class structure imposes basic limits on class formation, class consciousness, and class struggle is essentially a claim that it constitutes the basic mechanism for distributing access to resources in a society, and thus distributing the capacity to act" (p.28). This mechanism of distribution is a qualifier placed by Wright on the claim made by 'most Marxists' that class structure is identified one way or another as the basic determinant of the other three elements (ibid.). While deeming class structure to be the basic mechanism determining these elements, Wright acknowledges that he is unable to provide a description of the precise manner in which this determination occurs. Though offering that the precise mechanisms are cognitive, or psychological, Wright proposes to inform as to the more important, 'real' social mechanisms of determination.

Class struggle, in Wright's schema, provides the 'transformative principle' of class, but is ultimately determined by class structure (p.30). His second conceptual constraint is thus: 2) "class structures constitute the essential qualitative lines of social demarcation in the historical trajectories of social change" (ibid.). Not only does class structure determine class formation, class consciousness, and class struggle, but it also "limits the possibility for other aspects of social structure" (p.31). Class structure, in this way "constitutes the central organizing principles of societies" and within the area of classical Marxism "the crucial historical line of social demarcation remains class relations" (p.31). From these premises,

Wright is able to claim that "class structure is the central determinant of social power" (p.31).

Organizational status is hence for Wright, a function of class structure, which in turn imposes limits on an individual's or a collectivities' capacity to act. Consciousness is the "realization by the subordinate class that it is necessary to transform the class structure if there is to be any basic changes in their capacities to act, and the realization by the dominant class that the reproduction of their own power depends on the reproduction of the class structure" (1986a, p.28). Though acknowledging that class struggle constitutes the central transformative principle of social structure, Wright argues that this process is itself determined by class structure.

Wright's third constraint is simply 3) the concept of class is a relational concept. This argument simply dissociates Marxist, relational class concepts from gradational, typically income determined class concepts. Wright argues that gradational class concepts could not possibly provide the necessary "demarcations" upon which a theory of history could be developed (p.35). 4) The social relations which define classes are intrinsically antagonistic rather than symmetrical. Stated simply, classes constitute opposing interests. Consequently, 5) the objective basis of these antagonistic interests is exploitation, and hence results in exploitative relations. Finally, 6) the fundamental basis of exploitation is to be found in the social relations of production. Here, Wright argues that Marxist class models are necessarily production-centred.

In studying a cross-section of class structure, consequently, Wright limits his approach to testing hypotheses in which class position is causally prior to other variables measured in his survey. While he identifies this as a distinct contribution fundamentally opposed to other types of class analysis (1989, p.269-78), he also claims to be committed to a high level of Marxist theoretical integration (ibid., p.277). The impetus for this commitment comes partly from Marx's untimely death during his work on class categories in the last chapter of *Capital* Volume III: "What Constitutes a Class" (see Tucker, p.441). Marx identifies the three "big classes" of modern society as: 1) wage labourers 2) capitalists and 3) land owners. Though Marx views the class divisions of his England as "obliterated" by middle and intermediate strata, he views the process of capital as one of increasing polarization or "the (concentration) of scattered means of production into large groups" (p.441). Answering what constitutes a class, Marx responds (at first glance) "the identity of revenues and sources of revenues" (p.442). This, however, is seen as far too simplistic, given that, for example, physicians and officials also constitute separate classes with this criteria. Marx hence proposes that each class further involves an "infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of

labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords" (p.442). This suggests again that Marx's concept of class should not be reduced to crude analytic categories, but as a continuing process of polarization and concentration of class interests.

Sayer (1979) describes the paradox of Althusserian interpretations of Marx, which seems relevant in addressing Wright's specific approach. They attempt to overcome Marx's difficulty by ensuring a correspondence of concept and reality. The "mystifactory mechanism" which corresponds to ideological and phenomenological forms could not be located as a subjective error of experience, but must rather be seen as a subjective falsehood. In other words, reality is not misinterpreted, but rather misrepresents itself. If consciousness itself was to be doubted, a scientific interpretation of reality would be impossible. Marx could not begin to promote the "falsity of ideology (through a) materialist theory of consciousness" if he were to accept that this falsity is only subjective (p.31).

Emancipation, could not, for Marx, be promoted through such an investigation as is prescribed by Wright (1989, p.16). It is not the subjective illusions of capital, but rather the illusory function of the objective forms of capital which promote human alienation. It is an empirical analysis of the historical development of these objective forms that provides the historical revelation that capital is not given by nature, but is rather imposed on people, by people.

Sayer (1979) argues: "fetishism involves a two-fold transgression of proper categorical boundaries... on the one hand, properties which distinguish phenomena as individual members of classes and hence ought properly to be the object of historical categories are subsumed under transhistorical categories and explained by theses logically capable of accounting only for the characteristics of the classes to which they belong... and on the other hand, the historical attributes of the phenomena are thereby falsely universalized (p.46). Wright's analysis of class categories does not avoid the fetishized nature of class, but in fact contributes to it. For instance, the class distribution of respondents appears to Wright only as a cross-sectional description, not as historically contingent on capitalist forces of production. "Fetishism presents a dehistoricized, desocialized world whose makers are reduced to passive spectators in a mystery not of their making. Marx's critique points behind this, to a history. This is how Marx promotes the overcoming of human self-alienation" (Sayer, 1979, p.47).

CONCLUSION

Wright (1986a) claims to defend what he identifies as "The core theses of Marxism" (p.2). He terms his segment of the academic community "analytic Marxism"; "The systematic interpretation and clarification of basic concepts and their reconstruction into a more competent theoretical structure" (ibid.). In reference to Marx's unfinished section of Capital, volume 3 "What Constitutes a Class", Wright proposes that Classes (1986a) represents an extension of Marx's theory of class structure and class formation "faithful both to the theoretical agenda forged in Marx's work, that is, understanding the development of the contradictions of capitalism, and the political goals that agenda was meant to promote" - understanding the conditions for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society (p.16).

Historical materialism can be viewed as an approach wherein the various forms of exploitation as manifested in certain historical instances are studied. This materialist conception thus generates a higher level of theoretical abstraction whereby specific, less abstract societal forms can be understood. The key to Marx's analysis is not the generalized mode of economic exploitation as prescribed by Wright, but rather the specific historical forms or manifestations of this universal fact.

Wright's empiricism fails to move beyond describing existing structures, and is never conditioned by an awareness of the diachronic. This implies that to understand a structure, one must also understand both its transformations, and the range of its possible transformations. Though Wright (1989) admits that his method of class analysis "risks losing the dialectical and dynamic character" of Marxist explanations, he claims that these risks are worth taking (p.16). Admitting further that his empirical operationalizations of Marx's theory of class have generated only modest insights, they have nonetheless served to "clarify a range of dilemmas" (ibid.). Given, however, serious departures from both Marx's methods and observations, Wright possibly reifies a questionable version of Marx's classes, rather than extend his explanations.

Wright admits that while progress has been made in the conceptualization of class through his project in the past decade, "nevertheless the goal of producing a class structure concept which is at one time theoretically coherent and empirically comprehensive remains elusive" (1989, p.270). His approach remains, however, that of increasing the complexity of his various class structure typologies as a means of enhancing their explanatory power. In discussing advances made in his project, Wright alludes to the value of a general Marxist theory of history. His new structural typology, Wright argues, has a "much stronger connection to the general Marxist theory of history than did the earlier framework. The structural typology on which the class structure map was based

had a clear standing within the general theory of the historical trajectory of social forms" (p.306). However, conceptually basing a class typology on a generalized notion of epochal forms of material relations is no more than paying a lip service to the logic of historical analysis. The transformative principles providing the means to emancipation at each stage can only be implied, and not directly accessed through Wright's micro, ahistorical research focus.

This is not to say that Wright's project is not valuable, for it is in fact highly valuable. The survey has provided data for a wide range of interesting and important studies (e.g. Clement, 1990; Hubka and Gillespie, 1989; Baer et al, 1987; Black and Myles, 1986; Winn, 1984) and has made significant inroads to combining classical social theory with contemporary quantitative research methods. However, as I have argued above, class is more interesting as a dependent variable than as an independent variable and, in the interests of social change, is best seen as a process rather than as a structure. This opposition, on the other hand, is a fact of meta-theory, and is not to be resolved presently, if at all. The most valuable contribution of Wright's work will possibly be made, ironically, at the point that his project itself becomes a part of history - data of a past phase in capital relations. Historians, for example, often rely on centuries old church records to understand past demographic compositions. Marx's 18th Brumaire is a now famous schematic of class interests and material relations. Erich Fromm's survey of class consciousness among the working class in Weimar Germany is a fascinating and insightful study during an important period in world history (Fromm, 1984). The value of these sources of data to the social researcher today lies in the capacity to observe an historical trajectory. The rise of quantitative social research has involved a number of ongoing survey projects (eg. The General Social Survey conducted by Statistics Canada) enabling for the first time study of changes in survey data over time. Given recent changes in the world order, the predicted decline of U.S. economic strength and the continuing rise of global capital, it seems likely that Wright's in depth study of class structure will increase in value in the coming decades.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Parker, R.G. *Bodies, Pleasures and Passions: Sexual Culture in Contemporary Brazil*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.

Richard Parker's first book keeps the attention of readers interested in sexual culture and gender studies. The author, trained as an anthropologist, has published many articles about the social construction of gay identity in Brazil, and recently evaluated the impact of AIDS policies on the sexual behaviour of Brazilians. *Bodies, Pleasures and Passions* originates from his Doctoral dissertation. His main argument is that Brazilian sexuality is a social construction influenced by a unique historical condition. He also emphasized that the experience of sexual life in different settings is shaped as much by the cultural context as by the physiology of the species.

In the opening chapters, the author traces a portrait of the history of Brazil and how slavery influenced relations between men and women. The author believes that the miscegenation that occurs between the colonizers, slaves and the indigenous population had an impact on the sexual culture of Brazilians. His analysis relies mostly on the controversial works of Gilberto Freyre that depict a patriarchal social order in the 19th century. By analyzing sexual practices in contemporary Brazil, Parker, influenced by structuralism, explores the "ideology of the erotic" by scrutinizing the linguistic code that delimits the boundaries of sexual conduct. What can astonish readers is the extensive variations in the Brazilian sexual code. For instance in North America one drop of homosexuality de-masculinizes a man, while in Brazil the scenario appears to be different. Same-sex activities are tolerated and even encouraged as far as the hierarchical social order remains. The author suggests that the "real" man is the active partner and consequently will not be condemned by society, while the passive one receives a derogatory label. Nevertheless the scheme of a patriarchal and sexist society persists despite the resurgence of feminist movements; women endure oppression and discrimination both in rural and urban areas. The sexual roles are clearly defined as active/passive whether it is an heterosexual or homosexual encounter. Also, according to Parker's investigation bisexuality is widespread in Brazil. This supports one aspect of the machismo ideology that implies that a man can have numerous encounters with both women and men.

The presentation of the author is clear and he enhances his "propos" with extracts from thirty-one informants interviewed. My main criticism relies on two essential aspects that are underestimated in Parker's study. Firstly he does not make a clear differentiation on the sexual meanings between social class and "milieu". Only in the conclusion Parker specified that his study focuses on sexual culture in urban Brazil and not all Brazil. I

believe that a sharper analysis would enrich the debate. I also feel uncomfortable by the assumption of the author that the sexual linguistic code is singular to Brazil. Some of the vocables used in English and French have a similar connotation.

In conclusion *Bodies, Pleasures and Passions* is well documented with an extensive bibliography. For scholars pursuing fieldwork abroad, the appendix on his notes in the field are particularly useful. Parker's book will delight people who believe that sexuality does rely solely on biology and physiological processes, but like many aspects of life is socially constructed and encompasses a political component.

Reviewed by:
Michael Turcotte
Department of Sociology
and Anthropology
Carleton University

Aronowitz, Stanley & Henry A. Giroux. *Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture and Social Criticism*, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, \$20.50 paperback.

The current fascination with discourse theory has left many advocates of social change apologizing for "Grand Narratives" while the American Right has appropriated much of their radical critique of public education. Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux's *Postmodern Education* takes aim at both the morally indignant "Crisis of Excellence" that is dictating educational policy and also at the potential intellectual opposition to this onslaught. They use the language of postmodernism to give a new shine to critical pedagogy in an attempt to reintroduce these timely concerns to an audience that has dismissed anything remotely "Marxist" at a stroke in order to frolic in its simulacra.

Giroux was a secondary school teacher and Aronowitz once worked in a steel mill: they know that most students and workers cannot afford to celebrate the death of history. There is no Panic Schoolmarm here, no spectacle, no obscure jargon let loose to play in the footnotes. Yet, even as they "refuse to reduce social structures to discourse" (p. 160) in their examination of the transcendental notions that inform much of postmodernist discourse, Aronowitz and Giroux create an excellent comprehensive introduction to postmodernism.

Before examining *Postmodern Education*, readers versed in cultural theory might benefit by consulting a renowned educational journal (*Kappan* is popular among school teachers). Since Humanism is still in vogue with "Progressive" educators, Aronowitz and Giroux are cautious in their exploration of postmodernism. The valorization of the everyday, for instance, is emphasized not to encourage individual self-discovery but instead to define and legitimate the specific struggles of marginalized students. A parallel criticism of prevalent theoretical inclinations posits that "the political economy of the sign does not displace political economy" (p. 116); turning postmodernism on itself, the authors alternately praise or condemn this ouroboros in their quest to empower teachers and students for the creation of "democratic public spheres" (p. 89).

The book begins by contrasting progressive and postmodern ("postmodern" as critical theory in this instance) approaches to social change by analyzing Bennet's drug and education offensives. "Textual Authority, Culture and the Politics of Literacy" politicizes the theories of Bloom and Hirsch in a critical investigation of knowledge and power. "Postmodernism and the Discourse of Educational Criticism" provides an excellent introduction to postmodernism, noting in particular how Rorty's and Baudrillard's directions hinder the creation of a critical pedagogy.

Aware that curriculum "functions to name and privilege particular histories and experiences" (p. 96), Giroux continues in the fourth chapter to examine the role of teachers as transformative public intellectuals. Foucault's notion of counter-memory is used in "Border Pedagogy in the Age of Postmodernism" to explore how students can understand and struggle for the possibility of social transformation.

Cultural Studies is criticized for its ahistorical turn in chapter six while "Working Class Displacements and Postmodern Reflections" examines the myth of the disappearance of the working class. The conclusion's warning that "an apolitical postmodernism articulates perhaps unwittingly with a right-wing political agenda" (p. 190) and plea to go beyond "a politics of discourse and difference" (p. 192) exemplify the authors' struggle with the liberating and reactionary potential of postmodernism.

It is unfortunate that this significant analysis of contemporary education must manipulate -- and in turn become a critique of -- postmodernism so that critical thought and social responsibility somehow become "modernist ideals" (p. 57) and "postmodernism points to solidarity, community, and compassion as essential aspects of how we develop and understand the capacities we have for experiencing the world" (p. 117). Nevertheless, refusing to abandon history, Aronowitz and Giroux broach their emancipatory "Postmodernism" not only as an alternative to the ahistorical carnival of "The Postmodernism", but also, above all, as a strategy to establish a critical theory and practice of education.

Reviewed by:
George A. Fogarasi
Faculty of Education
University of Ottawa

RESEARCH NOTES

LA FOLIE AU DECLIN DU MOYEN-AGE

Paul Labelle
Department of Sociology-Anthropology
Carleton University

Le texte qui suit est un extrait d'une thèse qui examine l'émergence du concept de la maladie mentale dans l'Occident moderne. Comme étape préliminaire à cette émergence, il situe, décrit et explique les changements qui se sont opérés dans la pratique discursive déployée par l'ordre ecclésiastique sur la déviance en général et la folie en particulier, pendant la fin du Moyen Age. De même, les conséquences décisives de ces changements sur la folie sont explorées.

Dans l'Europe, jusqu'au 14^{ième} siècle, à l'intérieur de la pratique discursive exercée par le clergé sur la déviance en générale et la folie en particulier, on tend à associer la cause de la folie plutôt chez Dieu. Par contre, lors de la naissance du capitalisme et de l'émergence de la science comme forme de connaissance, le clergé incorpore un nouvel élément dans sa pratique discursive sur la déviance. Ce nouvel élément est la sorcellerie. L'inclusion de ce thème dans le savoir clérical de la déviance influencera, de façon décisive, la perception occidentale de la folie à la fin du Moyen Age et à la Renaissance. De nouveaux liens s'établissent entre la folie, la sorcellerie et le diable. A cette époque, la cause de la folie devient plus largement associée au diable et à la sorcellerie, plutôt qu'à Dieu.

Dans l'esprit occidental à la fin du Moyen Age, les sorcières et les sorciers souillent la terre par milliers. D'après le juge Bourgoignais Bogue, ceux-ci sont au nombre de 1,800,000¹. Trois-Echelles, vivant à l'époque de Charles IX, établit le nombre de sorciers contaminant la France au nombre de 300,000 (certains établissent ce chiffre à 30,000)². En accusant certains fous d'être des sorciers³, un lien entre la folie et la sorcellerie dans le discours clérical commence à s'établir⁴. Signes de folie et signes de sorcellerie commencent à se confondre. On inclut la pâleur, la «laidéur», la malpropreté corporelle, le goût pour la solitude et la conduite bizarre parmi les indices de la sorcellerie^{5,6}. Parmi ceux qu'on accuse de sorcellerie, on trouve des idiots, des délirants et des hystériques⁷. On inclut également des empoisonneurs, des infanticides et des bestiaires parmi les sorciers⁸.

Mais, la folie et la sorcellerie ne sont pas synonymes. On cite la sorcellerie comme une des causes de la folie⁹ tandis que la folie ne se trouve pas parmi les causes de la sorcellerie. Les

sorcières, au contraire des fous, ne perdent pas nécessairement l'esprit. Les clercs expliquent la sorcellerie par un "pacte" établi entre le diable et la sorcière¹⁰, où cette dernière se met au service du premier. Selon l'ordre ecclésiastique, le fait que c'est la sorcière de son propre gré qui établit un pacte avec satan, la rend responsable pour sa condition. Elle doit donc souffrir les conséquences de son péché contre la chrétienté. Les sorts qu'on réserve aux sorcières sont aussi drastiques qu'ils sont sévères. Par exemple, on leur rase le pubis, avant qu'elles paraissent devant les juges, afin qu'il soit impossible pour le diable de se cacher sur leur corps¹¹. Une fois trouvées coupable de sorcellerie, on brûle leur corps, afin que leur âme puisse s'échapper de l'emprise de satan.

En expliquant la sorcellerie par la possession démoniaque, une confusion dans le discours clérical entre la sorcellerie et la folie peut s'installer. La folie a la possession comme une de ses causes alors que la sorcellerie est uniquement causée par la possession. Un lien intime se développe entre folie et sorcellerie puisque les deux "états d'être" peuvent survenir grâce au même phénomène: la possession. Comme conséquence de ce nouveau lien entre folie et sorcellerie, plusieurs fous seront persécutés pour le crime de sorcellerie à la fin du Moyen Age¹². Souvent, à cette époque, folie et sorcellerie subissent le même sort.

Cette association entre la folie et la sorcellerie apparaît seulement à la fin du Moyen Age. De plus, elle n'émerge pas, en premier lieu du moins, chez les clercs. Avant cette période, l'ordre ecclésiastique nie l'existence des sorcières et de la sorcellerie, alors qu'il croît dans l'existence des démons et dans la possession démoniaque¹³. Le thème de sorcellerie émerge plutôt chez les laïques vers la fin du Moyen Age. Selon George Rosen¹⁴, pendant la période carolingienne, on considère la sorcellerie comme une offense séculière. A cette époque, la sorcellerie est exclue des offenses possibles contre l'Eglise, puisqu'on souligne qu'elle cause du dommage seulement à la propriété et au corps, et non à l'âme. On laisse donc les procès de sorcellerie aux mains des tribunaux laïques.

Avec la montée des procès de sorcellerie, les cours séculières deviennent de plus en plus puissantes. Selon Roland Villeneuve:

"Dès le début du XIV^{ème} siècle les juges séculiers s'efforcèrent de remplacer l'officialité. En 1390 le Parlement de Paris décida que la connaissance des crimes d'hérésies et de sorcellerie relevait des tribunaux laïcs, et d'eux seuls¹⁵."

Au Haut Moyen Age, l'Eglise tolère ceux et celles qui se disent sorciers, puisqu'elle ne croit pas dans la sorcellerie. Par contre, la croyance par les masses populaires dans l'existence de la sorcellerie, produit une «fissure» dans l'hégémonie

ecclésiastique à l'égard de l'explication de la déviance. Dès lors, une association entre la folie, la possession démoniaque, la sorcellerie et l'hérésie s'établit dans le savoir clérical à partir du 14^{ème} siècle. Par exemple, la faculté de théologie de Paris, en 1398, donne une preuve qui démontre que la sorcellerie inclut un pacte avec le démon et qu'elle est nécessairement hérétique⁸. On commence à utiliser le pouvoir inquisitionnel pour contrer cette montée de la sorcellerie⁹. Ainsi, l'ordre ecclésiastique arrache des mains des juges séculiers le droit de définir et de juger la sorcellerie, en convertissant cette dernière en une hérésie qu'on doit combattre en utilisant l'Inquisition¹⁰.

C'est surtout à partir de 1487 que la chasse aux sorcières prend de l'ampleur et qu'elle vient à occuper une place prépondérante dans l'agenda du clergé. C'est à cette date que le "Malleus Maleficarum" (traduit en français, ce titre signifie le "Marteau des Sorcières") est publié pour la première fois. L'impact de ce manuel sur le monde chrétien impressionne. Zilboorg estime qu'entre 1487 et 1669 le "Malleus" est édité 10 fois et qu'entre 1669 et 1769, le "Marteau des Sorcières" passe à travers neuf éditions nouvelles¹¹.

Le "Malleus Maleficarum", écrit par deux frères dominicains - Jacob Sprenger et Heinrich Kramer - ressemble à un livre de recettes que le clergé doit suivre dans les cas de sorcellerie. Le "Malleus" est divisé en trois parties¹². La première partie donne les trois éléments qui permettent l'existence de la sorcellerie. Ceux-ci sont le diable, la sorcière et la permission de Dieu. La deuxième partie du manuel touche les méthodes par lesquelles la sorcellerie fonctionne et les outils dont on dispose pour la combattre. Finalement, la troisième partie traite des procédures légales qu'il faut entreprendre dans les tribunaux ecclésiastiques et séculiers, lors des procès légaux entrepris contre les sorcières.

L'approbation par le pape Innocent VIII, par la faculté de théologie de Cologne et par le roi Maximilien¹³ amplifie l'impulsion que la chasse aux sorcières reçoit lors de l'apparition du "Marteau des Sorcières". En plus de répondre aux demandes du peuple, la chasse aux sorcières reçoit l'approbation officielle des administrateurs et des intellectuels du monde chrétien, de même que celle d'un leader du monde laïque. On perçoit maintenant la sorcellerie comme une réalité en soi, qui devient fermement ancrée dans l'esprit de ceux vivant à la fin du Moyen Age.

La publication du Malleus, l'approbation du clergé et d'un roi laïque, combinées avec les désirs d'un peuple qui ressent la fin du monde s'approcher, donnent un élan à une chasse aux sorcières qui atteint son sommet du 16^{ème} au 17^{ème} siècles¹⁴, et qui laissera des traces jusqu'au 19^{ème} siècle. Pendant cette période, grâce aux nouveaux liens entre la folie, la possession et la sorcellerie, on évoque de plus en plus le diable comme source de folie.

L'ordre ecclésiastique construit plusieurs hypothèses pour expliquer comment Satan prend possession de ses victimes. On croit qu'il peut s'infiltrer dans l'individu par voie orale, pendant que ce dernier consomme sa nourriture ou même pendant qu'il respire²³. La sanction, donnée à ces hypothèses, par le pape George le Grand, nous indique la validité qu'elles reçoivent à l'époque²⁴. Une autre théorie stipule que le diable peut s'insérer dans sa victime lorsqu'elle sommeille²⁵.

Les médecins de l'époque, dont la plupart possèdent une instruction qui inclut les canons religieux de l'époque, expliquent la folie en se basant sur le même savoir. Lorsqu'un médecin distingué de l'époque - John Lange - trouve des clous, des aiguilles et des couteaux dans les corps des possédés qu'il examine après leur mort, il voit dans ces objets la confirmation de l'existence d'une maladie surnaturelle. Selon lui, c'est Satan qui dépose de tels objets dans le corps²⁶. Le clinicien Jean Fernel qualifie la lycanthropie comme une entité clinique, causée par le démon²⁷. D'autres médecins tels qu'Ambroise Paré²⁸ et Leloyer²⁹ croient dans la possession démoniaque. Ce dernier pense que le diable pénètre le corps de l'individu à travers un organe défectueux³⁰.

Ces explications trouvent leur validité grâce à certains cas où les théories démonologiques semblent être confirmées par des démonstrations empiriques. D'après Alexander et Selesnick, il existe des cas où des personnes, "atteintes de troubles affectifs graves, étaient particulièrement sensibles à la suggestion qu'elles donnaient asile à des diables et à des démons, et elles avouaient cohabiter avec le démon"³¹. Le contenu même des délires de certains fous semble donner une validité aux théories ecclésiastiques. Comme exemple, citons un cas en Angleterre au 14^{ème} siècle, où une femme, du nom de Margery of Kemp, souffre parfois de frénésie et de délires. Selon cette femme et divers membres du clergé anglais et de l'aristocratie anglaise, ces délires constituent en fait des visions saintes qui proviennent de Dieu³².

Pour le prêtre et en général pour tous les gens de l'époque, où le surnaturel et l'expérience mythique constituent des éléments essentiels de la vie, une prédisposition sociale dans la croyance des dires des fous existe. Par exemple, selon Bartholomaeus Anglicus, un théologien dominicain, les possédés ne perdent aucunement le pouvoir de la raison et leurs déclarations doivent être prises aux sérieux par les tribunaux³³. Selon l'ordre ecclésiastique, les hallucinations auditives et visuelles vécues par certains fous servent d'indicateurs, non pas de leur perte de la raison, mais de leur pacte avec le diable³⁴. Ces hallucinations, interprétées à l'intérieur d'une pratique discursive spécifique (c.à d. celle du clergé), confirment l'existence du surnaturel et du mysticisme, et contribuent, en même temps, au maintien du pouvoir que le clergé possède sur le savoir médiéval.

A la fin du Moyen Age, ce glissement, vers les thèmes plus macabres du discours, que l'ordre ecclésiastique entreprend sur la déviance en général et la folie en particulier, est symptomatique d'un phénomène plus large. Ce phénomène constitue l'écroulement de la société féodale dans son ensemble³⁵. L'ancienne infrastructure féodale commence à céder à un nouvel ordre économique: celui du capitalisme. Des nouvelles formes de connaissance apparaissent, tels que la prolifération des sectes religieuses païennes au 13^{ème} siècle³⁶. Pendant le même siècle, Roger Bacon préconise la création du savoir, non d'après les écrits saints, mais d'après la méthode expérimentale³⁷. L'Eglise réagit envers ce premier bris dans son monopole sur le savoir en instituant l'Inquisition, dès le 13^{ème} siècle³⁸. Dorénavant, le clergé inclut tout savoir, tels que le paganisme, la science et la sorcellerie, qu'il considère comme dangereux parmi les hérésies. La chasse aux sorcières et le développement de la démonologie sont des éléments importants de cette réaction du clergé face à l'écroulement de la société qui permet son existence.

Dans une société à imaginaire religieux, l'explication de tout phénomène tend à être religieux. Lorsque cette société s'écroule, elle peut seulement trouver une explication pour cet effondrement dans les éléments qui constituent son imaginaire social. Une société ne peut pas expliquer les phénomènes selon des termes qu'elle ne peut pas concevoir. Le clergé peut seulement expliquer le dépérissement de sa société selon le savoir qu'il génère à l'intérieur de l'imaginaire de son époque. L'ordre ecclésiastique perd son pouvoir avec le déclin de la société féodale. Cette perte et ce déclin sont perçus comme des maux par les clercs et par les membres de la société féodale. Dans l'Europe du Moyen Age, on associe le mal avec Satan puisque ce dernier représente tout ce qui est maudit dans le monde. L'Europe féodale explique donc son effondrement en l'associant avec Satan et trouve des éléments, dans l'environnement physique et social, qui représentent Satan. Le comportement déviant de certains fous les rend vulnérables à des interprétations démonologiques de leur malaise. A la fin du Moyen Age, les européens voient en ces gens des représentants de Satan et projettent leur anxiété sur eux. On enferme, on torture et on brûle ceux qu'on accuse de possession et de sorcellerie. Conséquemment, la folie subit souvent le même sort, à cause de son association avec la possession dans le discours cléricale.

Pendant que la chasse aux sorcières atteint son apogée lors des 16^{ème} et 17^{ème} siècles, un contre-courant religieux qui conteste l'autorité de l'Eglise catholique romaine, prend naissance et se propage surtout dans les nouveaux États de l'Europe du nord. Ce mouvement, connu sous le nom de la Réforme Protestante, brise une fois pour toute l'hégémonie détenue par l'Eglise catholique en Occident. Les conséquences de ce mouvement, accouplées avec le développement du capitalisme et de la méthode expérimentale, à une époque où on commence à valoriser une nouvelle application de la raison humaine, donneront une impulsion à un processus qui changera

définitivement la perception que l'Occident possède envers la folie. Ce processus aboutira, au 19ième siècle, à la consolidation de l'explication médicale et scientifique de la folie.

Endnotes

1. Zilboorg, G., A History of Medical Psychology, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1941, p. 162.

2.- Idem.

3.- Ibid, p. 153

Graham T., Medieval Minds: Mental Health in the Middle Ages, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1967, pp. 78-79.

4.- A l'époque, on accuse plus les femmes que les hommes de la sorcellerie.

5.- Quelques-uns de ces indices correspondent à des symptômes et à des traits associés à plusieurs maladies mentales modernes.

6.- Villeneuve, R., L'univers diabolique, Editions du Jour, Montréal, 1972, p. 305.

7.- Idem.

8.- Idem.

9.- Schoeneman, T. J., "The Role of Mental Illness in the European Witch Hunts of the 16th and 17th Centuries: An Assessment, Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 13(4), 1977, p.341.

10.- Conrad, P., Shneider, J.W., Deviance and Medicalization, The c.v. Mosby Company, St. Louis, 1980, p.42.

11.- Alexander et Selesnick, The History of Psychiatry, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1967, p. 85.

12.- Nous disons plusieurs puisqu'il est évident qu'on ne classifie pas tous les fous parmi les sorciers. Par contre, à la fin du Moyen âge, il existe une tendance à vouloir expliquer la folie par des théories démonologiques.

13.- Kirsch, I., "Demonology and the Rise of Science: An Example of the Misperception of Historical Data," Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences (2), 1978, p. 152.

14.- Kroll, J., "A Reappraisal of Psychiatry in the Middle Ages," Archives of General Psychiatry 29, 1973, p. 79

Rosen, G., Madness in Society, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, p.8.

- 15.- Villeneuve, R., op.cit., p. 302.
- 16.- Kirsch, I., op.cit., p. 154.
- 17.- L'Inquisition est une institution établie par l'Eglise, au 13ième siècle, afin de combattre la montée des hérésies. Le clergé définit l'hérésie comme toute connaissance qui tente de supplanter celles de l'Eglise chrétienne. Comme on peut prévoir, les hérésies, selon le discours clérical, sont d'origine démoniaque et elles doivent alors être persécutées. En designant la sorcellerie comme une hérésie, la folie- simulacre de la sorcellerie- sera elle aussi persécutée.
- 18.- L'ordre ecclésiastique, tout en demeurant l'autorité sur la sorcellerie, permet au cours civils d'entamer des procès de sorcellerie.
- 19.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit., p.152.
- 20.- Graham, T., op.cit., p.79.
- 21.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit., p.151
Graham, T., op.cit., pp.77-78.
- 22.- Schoenaman, T., op.cit., p.346.
- 23.- White, A., A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Chistendom Vol II, George Braziller, New York, 1955, p.120.
- 24.- Idem.
- 25.- Idem.
- 26.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit.,p.166.
- 27.- Ibid, p.167.
- 28.- Ackernecht, E., A Short History of Psychiatry, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, p.19.
- 29.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit., p.169.
- 30.- Idem.
- 31.- Alexander, F.G., Selesnick, S.T., op.cit., p.85.
- 32.- Neaman, J., Suggestion of the Devil: Insanity in the Middle Ages and the Twentieth Centiry Octagon Books, New York, 1978, pp.122-126.
- 33.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit., p.172.

- 34.- Ibid, pp.157-158.
- 35.- Zilboorg, G., op.cit., p.153
Kroll, J., op.cit., p.280.
- 36.- Kirsch, I., op.cit., p.153.
- 37.- Idem.
- 38.- Idem.

STUDYING PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC KNOWLEDGE:
NOTES TOWARD A WORKING DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY*

Mary-Anne Kandrack
Department of Sociology-Anthropology
Carleton University

In the broadest terms, my interest in psychotherapy concerns the production and circulation of knowledge and the reproduction/transformation of relations of domination and subordination. More specifically, I am currently examining the limits and possibilities of feminist therapy as a transformative politics and emancipatory intervention. The purpose of this discussion, assuming that it is in and through discourse and discursive practices that knowledge and ideology are linked, is to suggest how ideology might be defined in the development of an analytical framework for the critical exegesis of feminist therapy that is being undertaken.

Before proceeding, it should be noted that my attempt to (re)conceptualize ideology is, at least in part, a response to Foucault's rejection of the concept (cf., 1980: 118). This simply cannot be detailed here. Suffice it to say that it is imperative to recognize power/knowledge as discursive practices that are as enabling as they are constraining (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Thompson, 1980) and, at the same time, to employ the concept of ideology as an analytical tool for specifying, with greater clarity and precision, the distinction between subjugation and empowerment (Kress, 1985).

The concept of ideology, as the literature demonstrates, is highly controversial (Larrain, 1978; Marx and Engels, 1970; Ricoeur, 1986; Thompson: 1984). It is not within the scope of this discussion to provide even a cursory review of the work in this area. One significant issue concerning the concept, however, is the manner in which it has lost its critical, analytical edge inasmuch as it has been used to refer to belief systems in general with little or no reference to the critique of domination for which it was originally intended (Jacoby, 1975; Thompson, 1984). The result of this is that virtually everything and anything can be and has been construed as ideological thereby rendering the concept little more than a descriptive label. In short, the concept becomes an adjective with minimal, if any, analytical utility. Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with efforts to theorize ideology, I take the position that such a concept is invaluable to my research to the extent that it assists in distinguishing between domination and resistance.

My effort to reformulate the concept of ideology proceeds by situating it in relation to the substantive problem at hand, namely, the contemporary discourse of mental illness. Therefore, it is important to consider the discursive practices/knowledges

characteristic of psychotherapeutic rationality in the apparatuses of subjugation, regulation and control. The rise to pre-eminence of positivistic science, for example, has been a significant concern in the history of psychiatry (Brown, 1984; Foucault, 1973; Ingleby, 1983; Scull, 1979). Positivistic rationality is implicated in the knowledge(s) that construct the comprehension of socio-cultural as well as material reality (Habermas, 1970). There are a number of problems with the transposition of these epistemological and methodological precepts from the natural to social worlds (Ingleby, 1983; Turner, 1988).

Habermas (1970), for example, provides a clear articulation of the implications of these developments for the 'social life world'. Most notable among these is the 'objectification' of fundamentally social processes, namely, human behaviour and experience. While science and technology are referred to as ideological, the concept of ideology is never explicitly defined. His analysis is nonetheless informative although the meaning of ideology must be inferred from its usage. In an effort to reformulate the concept for the purpose of my analysis of feminist therapy, I would suggest that for Habermas (1970) the concept of ideology refers precisely to the objectification of social processes for the purpose of technical manipulation and control (as opposed to practical or emancipatory aims {Habermas, 1972}).

Habermas (1970) breaks with the orthodox Marxist preoccupation with the strictly economic determination of social relations inasmuch as he suggests that science and technology constitute the contemporary system of domination and subordination which is particularly insidious because it also provides for its own legitimation. This opens a much broader space in which to examine the power/knowledge nexus (Foucault, 1980) compared to that determined by economic exigencies. In short, the objectification of human subjects is in no sense determined exclusively or unproblematically by the economic. Moreover, legitimation is itself another dimension of ideology to the extent that "relations of domination are represented as legitimate" (Thompson, 1984: 131).

A third dimension of ideology is the manner in which language constructs specific understandings of social life (Kress, 1985). I would concur, that is, with Finn's (1982) argument that ideology refers specifically to discourses that mystify the nature of social reality. More specifically, mystification refers to the presentation of "a partial truth about reality as if it were the whole truth" (Finn, 1982: 41). To illustrate this, consider the notion of the 'individualization' of deviance. In this process, deviance is located inside the individual as a function of some defective organic and/or biographical process. This is only part of the story as it were, since individualization obscures the social relations/processes constitutive of and constituted by agency, deviant or otherwise. Related to this is what Thompson refers to as "dissimulation" in which "relations of domination...present

themselves as something other than what they are" (1980:131). For example, psychotherapeutic discursive practices are never articulated as processes of regulation and control but rather as humane treatments.

Lastly, Finn (1982) also argues that ideology is involved not only in the mystification of social reality but also in its reification. This suggests that certain conceptualizations of social processes and human subjects ascribe to them fixed, immutable properties (ie., objectification) that circumscribe both conceptual and practical activity vis-a-vis the process/subject in question (ie., mystification). These conceptualizations become reified to the extent that they are taken to be objectively given facts revealed in and through language. This serves to obfuscate the socially constructed nature of knowing and knowledge by separating the knower from the known (Finn, 1982). Reification affords certain discourses and discursive practices a transhistorical and universal character thereby reproducing the power relations within which they are articulated. This is to suggest that, in the case of the individualization of deviance, efforts to account for and ameliorate deviance must conform to that which is construed as most 'reasonable' (cf., Foucault, 1973), namely, those aimed at the individual.

This is, admittedly, only a sketch of the contours of ideology, but it is a start. The dimensions of ideology outlined above provide a starting point for an analysis of ideology, as it is articulated in discursive practices, as discourses that reproduce rather than contest power relations (Thompson, 1984: 131). What remains to be done in fleshing out the concept is to conceptualize it in relation to a broader social theory (Thompson, 1984). This cannot, however, be undertaken here.

By way of conclusion, it is clear that the study of the production and circulation of knowledge(s) benefits significantly from the considerations proper to post-structuralism, most notably Foucault (1972; 1980), which inform my research. The present discussion in no way addresses or settles all of the problems nascent in this area of research, and in fact, may well add to them. However, I would suggest that it provides some direction in conceptualizing ideology as an analytical tool in a critical examination of disciplinary knowledges, in this case, feminist therapy.

ENDNOTES

* These 'notes' are drawn from a discussion developed in my doctoral thesis, Knowledge, Ideology and Resistance: Politics and Possibility in Feminist Therapy.

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